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CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET
Carl Tobias*
This article uses the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CIRA)
as the backdrop for addressing efforts to increase uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and to decrease expense and delay in
civil litigation. Professor Tobias discusses both the origin and the
implementation of the CIRA. By requiring each federal district
court to formulate a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan,
the purpose of the CIRA is to decrease expense and delay in civil
litigation. Professor Tobias argues that the CIRA has been successful because districts have applied techniques that have saved
cost and time and have provided new data that may prove valuable
upon evaluation. Yet he argues that the CIRA does have shortfalls.
A primary shortfall addressed in this article is that the CIRA effectively suspended the purpose of the Judicial Improvements Act of
1988 (JIA) to increase uniformity and simplicity in civil litigation.
After a thorough evaluation of the effectuation of the CIRA, Professor Tobias ultimately suggests that policy makers capitalize on
the best aspects of the CIRA and the JIA, and he offers proposals
for the future to increase efficiency in civil litigation.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) instituted the most
ambitious effort to experiment with procedures for reducing expense
and delay in civil litigation during the 200-year history of the federal
courts. All ninety-four federal district courts undertook searching introspection of their civil and criminal caseloads and then adopted and
applied measures that they believed would best conserve resources.
Statutory enactment and implementation proved controversial partly
because it is unclear precisely how much cost and delay attend civil
lawsuits and whether either is sufficiently troubling to warrant treatment, especially with the mechanisms prescribed in the legislation and
employed by the districts.
The passage and effectuation of the CJRA have also been problematic because numerous courts have enforced local requirements
that conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provisions in
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
was a Professor of Law at the University of Montana when I completed most of the work on this
article. I wish to thank Lauren Robel and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer
and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust and Ann and Tom Boone
for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group
for the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed here and the
errors that remain are mine.
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the United States Code, and strictures in the remaining districts. This
development has made the arcane state of federal civil litigation even
more byzantine. An overwhelming number of procedural mandates
now govern civil disputes. There are commands in the federal rules
and the United States Code, while a plethora of local measures, including local rules, individual judge practices, and the aforementioned
CJRA requirements, cover civil cases in every federal court. Too
many of the strictures are inconsistent, and some are difficult to discover, comprehend, and satisfy. These phenomena have further fragmented the already fractured condition of civil procedure and may
actually have increased expense and delay in civil suits-impacts that
are diametrically opposed to the 1990 statute's express goals. Indeed,
the federal rules' fundamental tenets, such as uniformity and simplicity, are now more eroded than at any time since the Supreme Court
first promulgated those rules in 1938.
Despite these complications, experimentation under the CJRA
has apparently afforded numerous benefits. A significant percentage
of districts have developed innovative, or applied existing, techniques
that apparently have saved cost or time, while the testing of many
mechanisms has generated much raw data that deserve evaluation and
synthesis and that should yield instructive insights on district courts
and civil litigation at the conclusion of the twentieth century.
Now that the unprecedented, seven-year experiment with procedures for decreasing expense and delay is drawing to a close, the experience warrants analysis. This article undertakes that effort. The
opening section traces the CJRA's origins and development, emphasizing the Supreme Court's adoption of the initial federal rules and the
subsequent half-century history, the 1988 passage of the Judicial Improvements Act (JIA), and the 1990 enactment of the CJRA. 1
The second part assesses CJRA implementation. It first examines the detriments and advantages of experimentation's effectuation,
oversight, and evaluation in the ninety-four courts and the efficacy of
the measures that districts prescribed and employed. The section next
affords lessons derived from statutory implementation, ascertaining
that the CJRA was a modest reform that the vast majority of courts
cautiously effectuated, as evidenced by the RAND Corporation's
finding that the procedures applied had minimal impact on important
parameters, namely, cost. Congress also intended the CJRA and the
JIA to treat the above problems in modern civil disputing, although
the enactments may have exacerbated the difficulties in certain respects because senators and representatives apparently failed to think
1. The JIA is Title IV of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071-2074
(1994)). The CJRA is Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)).
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through the process and reconcile the statutory purposes and
implementation.
The third part offers suggestions for the future that policy makers, such as Congress and judges, should effectuate. It posits numerous principles that support the recommendations provided and that
could inform their implementation. For example, I propose that the
CJRA and the JIA be harmonized, principally by maximizing the statutes' best features and minimizing their worst aspects. Senators and
representatives should specifically allow the CJRA to sunset and facilitate the comprehensive effectuation of the JIA's major objectives of
restoring the primacy of the national rule revision process and limiting
local procedural proliferation, goals that the CJRA essentially suspended. Congress must also defer to that national amendment process and eschew legislative revision, while the districts should
abrogate all inconsistent local requirements, particularly strictures
that they adopted under the 1990 statute.
I.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM AcT

The origins and development of the CJRA warrant relatively detailed examination in this article, even though several commentators
have rather thoroughly chronicled the relevant background elsewhere.2 Comparatively broad analysis is justified because that type of
assessment can improve understanding of the CJRA and because the
coalescence of a rich, complex mix of phenomena, most of which can
be traced to the federal rules' 1938 adoption, eventually culminated in
statutory enactment.
A.

The 1938 Federal Rules and Their First Half Century

The developments that prompted Congress to pass the 1934
Rules Enabling Act,3 authorizing the U.S. Supreme Court to prescribe
rules of practice for civil litigation in the federal district courts, deserve considerable treatment here. This background, especially the
promulgation of the initial federal rules during 1938, enhances comprehension of subsequent developments, implicating the first half-century experience with those rules, which ultimately led to enactment of
the JIA and of the CJRA.
2.

See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62
L. REV. 833 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992); and Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994), for thorough discussion of the origins and
development of the CIRA of 1990.
3. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994)). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 u. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
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The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the 1938 Federal Rules

Around the turn of the century, judges, attorneys, and law professors became increasingly dissatisfied with common-law and code practice and procedure, and this concern prompted growing calls for
reform. 4 Support for change escalated after Roscoe Pound's famous
1906 speech to the American Bar Association. 5 A disparate coalition
of individuals as diverse as Dean Pound and Chief Justice William
Howard Taft eventually developed a compromise that Congress
passed as New Deal legislation during 1934.6 The statute empowered
the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure covering resolution of civil litigation in the federal district courts. 7 During 1935, the
Court appointed the initial Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules,
which included four law professors and nine attorneys and whose reporter was Charles Clark. 8 The Committee commenced work that
year and tendered its draft to the Supreme Court during 1937.9 The
Court modified little of the material that the Committee had submitted and forwarded the procedures as altered to the attorney general,
who transmitted them to Congress in January 1938. The proposals
took effect by congressional inaction during September 1938. 10
Charles Clark and the Committee members meant to treat the
problems of common-law and code practice and procedure.11 The
drafters intended to modify the highly technical character of the prior
procedural regimes, thereby eliminating the "sporting theory" of justice.12 The attorneys and law professors had numerous concepts in
mind when writing the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 The
Advisory Committee wished to craft procedures that were simple, uniform, and transsubstantive, that is, procedures generalized across substantive lines. 14 The lawyers and academicians also wanted to afford
4. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 78 (1989); Burbank,
supra note 3, at 1035-48; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 949 (1987).
5. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 409-13 (1906).
6. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 944-73; see also Burbank, supra note 3, at 1090-98.
7. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1098-1184.
8. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
494, 502-15 (1986); Subrin, supra note 4, at 961-82.
9. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 494; Subrin, supra note 4, at 961-83.
10. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 973; see also Resnik, supra note 8, at 494 n.l.
11. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 4, at 914-21, 926-73; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272-73 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 439-40 (1986); Subrin, supra note 4, at 948-73; see also
Pound, supra note 5, at 405-06 ("sporting theory"). See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965).
13. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of
the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975); Tobias, supra note 11, at 272-77.
14. See Cover, supra note 13, at 718. See generally Carl Tobias, The Transformation of
Trans-substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992).
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attorneys much control over litigation, particularly in discovery; to
limit judicial discretion; to foster prompt, inexpensive dispute resolution; and to emphasize merits-based dispositions. 15 The Committee
attempted to achieve simplicity by reducing the significance of pleading and limiting the number of steps in litigation. 16 It concomitantly
wished to increase uniformity by requiring that each federal district
court apply identical procedures. 17
These basic procedural precepts were not absolutes, and they
might even conflict. For example, Federal Rule 83,18 by providing that
each of the ninety-four federal district courts could adopt local procedures, enabled them to prescribe requirements that would undermine
uniformity and simplicity. The choice to institute an equity-driven
scheme, by essentially merging law into equity, 19 and to rely upon a
liberal, flexible procedural regime correspondingly opened access to
federal courts and fostered the pursuit of complicated lawsuits with
multiple parties and issues that could increase cost and delay in resolving disputes. 20 Affording lawyers considerable control while restricting that of judges concomitantly facilitated unfocused litigation and
broad discovery that might impose expense and delay.
2.

The Federal Rules' First Third of a Century

The Advisory Committee and the federal judiciary were able to
maintain the fundamental procedural tenets examined above during
the first three decades after the 1938 federal rules' adoption. 21 The
Committee proffered relatively few amendments, a number of which
were technical in nature, while federal courts encountered little difficulty interpreting and enforcing the initial rules and praised their efficacy.22 For instance, the judiciary promoted simplicity by relying upon
a general, liberal pleading system, which it pragmatically and flexibly
applied, and by essentially leaving discovery to counsel. 23 The judges
15. For discussion of these and other important goals of the drafters, see Resnik, supra
note 8, at 502-15; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 AB.A. J.
1648 (1981); and Tobias, supra note 11, at 272-77.
16. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 15, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 11, at 274; see also Marcus, supra note 12, at 439-40.
17. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650 (discussing uniform procedures); Tobias, supra
note 11, at 274-75 (same).
18. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83.
19. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 1000-01; Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Tobias, supra note
11, at 274-75.
20. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 1001; Resnik, supra note 8, at 502 n.30.
21. See Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 CoLUM. L. REV.
435 (1958). See generally Resnik, supra note 8, at 516; Tobias, supra note 11, at 277-78.
22. Charles Clark, the Reporter and a Second Circuit judge, fostered some of this. See,
e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in
the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49 (1957); see also Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to
the Federal Rules?, 14 Omo ST. L.J. 241 (1953); Tobias, supra note 11, at 277-78.
23. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 439-40, 445-46 (pleading); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 397 (1982) (discovery). But cf Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing
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also preserved and fostered uniformity by prescribing comparatively
few local procedures, especially strictures that were inconsistent with
the federal rules or acts of Congress. 24
Each of the original federal rules was not equally effective, and
judges, lawyers, and litigants undermined certain essential procedural
precepts. For example, in the 1950s, the liberal pleading system
prompted judges of the Ninth Circuit to request amendment of Rule
8, while Charles Clark repelled an analogous effort mounted by judges
in the Southern District of New York. 25 The simple, but open-ended,
discovery regime led to some difficulties, such as broad discovery requests, which proved particularly problematic in complex cases. 26
3.

The Federal Rules Since the Mid-1970s

Numerous developments have led to growing disenchantment
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this concern was initially expressed in the 1970s. Many judges, a number of attorneys, and
some writers contended that there was a litigation explosion in the
federal courts. 27 These observers claimed that lawyers and litigants
were bringing substantial numbers of civil cases, too few of which
were meritorious. 28 Several members of the Supreme Court voiced
discontent about abuse of the litigation process, especially in discovery, and they remonstrated appellate and district court judges to sanction attorneys and parties who perpetrated abuse. 29

Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (!), 81
HARV. L. REv. 356 (1967) (suggesting Rules 19, 23, and 24 were read inflexibly); Benjamin
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (II), 81 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1968).
24. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2016-19 (1989). Many states
premised their procedures on the federal analogues. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2237 (1989); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377-78 (1986).
25. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 445.
26. See New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheus Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
CoLuM. L. REV. 480 (1958) (contemporaneous account); Subrin, supra note 4, at 982-84 (subsequent account).
27. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECrIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23, 24 (A. Leo
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in id. at 209, 211-12; see also Tobias, supra note 11, at 287-89.
28. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Arthur R. Miller, The
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998-100
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S.
639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975).
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Managerial Judging

A number of federal district court judges, principally in large
metropolitan districts, such as the Central District of California and
the Southern District of New York, responded to the perceived litigation explosion and abuse with numerous measures that facilitated
their active involvement in civil cases and that were dubbed "managerial judging." 30 The judges relied upon pretrial conferences to oversee
litigation's pace, narrow and resolve disputed issues, and foster settlement, typically by employing certain alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) techniques. 31
A number of judges monitored the breadth and pace of discovery, and some courts imposed sanctions for abuses of the discovery or
litigation processes. 32 Certain judges developed creative techniques,
such as minitrials and mandatory summary jury trials, particularly for
treating complex litigation. 33 The Manual for Complex Litigation 34
correspondingly afforded a plethora of mechanisms for resolving specific types of complex cases, such as securities, mass tort, and employment discrimination suits. The 1983 revisions in the federal rules and
the 1985 issuance of the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, 35 effectively codified many practices with which judges had been experimenting under the rubric of managerial judging.
The 1983 amendments of Rules 11, 16, and 26 undermined uniformity and simplicity. For example, all three revisions eroded simplicity by expanding the number of steps in a lawsuit and by imposing
increased, and more onerous, duties on attorneys, such as mandatory
participation in pretrial and discovery conferences. 36 Rule 16's new
version reduced uniformity by suggesting that judges tailor procedures
to specific cases and that each judge craft individual scheduling orders
30. See generally STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouRTS (1977); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal
Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 675-78 (1988).
31. See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424 (1986) (ADR); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 770 (1981) (remaining propositions); Resnik, supra note 23, at 391-400 (same).
32. See Peckham, supra note 31; Resnik, supra note 23, at 391-400.
33. See E. ALLAN LIND & JoHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF CouRT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT CouRTS (1983); Frank E. Sander, Varieties of Dispute
Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
34. MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LITIGATION (1982). See generally Alan J. Simons, The Manual
for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 473
.
(1988).
35. Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461U.S.1097 (1983); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985).
36. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933 (1991). See generally ARTHUR R.
MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1984).
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for particular categories of cases. 37 The Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, concomitantly reduced uniformity by instructing judges
to treat many complicated suits differently than routine, simple cases
and to adjust specific measures to particular classes of complex
actions. 38
b.

The Proliferation of Local Procedures

Another critical source of mounting dissatisfaction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been the profound increase in local
procedures since the 1938 rules' adoption, a phenomenon that has expanded exponentially in the last quarter century. Courts instituted
much managerial judging, particularly before the 1983 federal rule revisions, by promulgating local procedures. 39 These local strictures frequently conflicted with the federal rules, acts of Congress, and local
procedures in the remaining ninety-three federal districts. The classic
illustration was the Northern District of California's promulgation of a
"complex rule" that required attorneys to attend preliminary meetings
apart from the pretrial conference and prepare joint pretrial statements addressing many factors, such as the disputed factual issues and
settlement negotiations. 40 Since the mid-1970s, judges have prescribed growing numbers of local strictures, either under the heading
of managerial judging or independently.
In the 1980s, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
policy-making arm of the federal courts, recognized the difficulties
that attended local procedural proliferation and responded in several
ways. The Conference orchestrated issuance of the 1985 amendment
of Federal Rule 83 that specifically required that the standing orders
of specific judges not conflict with the federal rules or local rules. 41
The advisory committee's note that attended the revision asked each
district to implement procedures for adopting and monitoring standing orders. 42 The note correspondingly requested that circuit judicial
councils review all local rules and determine if the provisions were
valid or conflicted and if they promoted interdistrict consistency and
uniformity. 43
37. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 36, at 942-46. See generally In re
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988).
38. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 11, at 292 n.148. Managerial
judging was occurring in state court systems at the same time. For example, many trial judges in
urban areas responded to civil backlogs with procedures, such as special pretrial conferences,
discovery limitations, and ADR. See BARRY MAHONEY, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL CouRTS
(1988). See generally Lieberman & Henry, supra note 31; Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model
and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1553 (1994).
39. See Peckham, supra note 31, at 773-77; Resnik, supra note 23, at 399.
40. See N.D. CAL. R. 235-7, reprinted in Peckham, supra note 31, at 776 n.30; see also
Peckham, supra note 31, at 776-77.
41. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83 (1985 amend.).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amend.).
43. See id.
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The Judicial Conference also responded to local proliferation by
establishing the Local Rules Project. 44 The Conference asked the
Project to assemble and organize each local rule, individual judge
standing order, and every other local stricture that functioned similarly.45 Moreover, the Conference requested that the Project analyze
difficulties that proliferating local requirements created and suggest
means of treating the difficulties that the Project discovered. 46
In 1989, the Project issued its assessment of local civil procedures.47 The Project found that the federal district courts had promulgated some 5000 local rules, many of which conflicted with the federal
rules, provisions of the United States Code, and local requirements in
other courts. 48 The most widely adopted local strictures governed the
pretrial process, especially pretrial conferences and discovery. Many
districts employed a number of specific measures, such as presumptive
numerical limitations on interrogatories or special case-tracking
schemes for addressing comparatively routine, simple cases. 49 The
ninety-four districts also varied significantly. For instance, the Middle
District of Georgia had issued only one local rule and eleven standing
orders, even as the Central District of California had prescribed
thirty-one local rules with 434 subrules, augmented by 275 standing
orders. 50
Local rules are merely one type of local stricture that has undermined uniformity and simplicity. The Local Rules Project found that
quite a few additional requirements, variously denominated general
orders, standing orders, special orders, scheduling orders, or minute
orders, as well as individual judge practices, covered local litigation in
the ninety-four districts. 51 Many courts and judges have also employed numerous procedures that they have not reduced to writing. 52
44. See COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACflCE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJEcr: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACfICE (1989)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PRorncr]; see also Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The
Role of Local Rules, AB.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62 (providing summary of Local Rules Project).
45. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers,
Project Director, Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992).
46. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers,
supra note 45.
47. See REPORT OF THE LocAL RULES PROJEcr, supra note 44.
48. See Subrin, supra note 24, at 2020-26; see also Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 62-65.
49. See, e.g., U.S. D1sT. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JusTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCflON PLAN 2 (1991), available in 1991WL525112 (C.J.R.A.) [hereinafter E. DIST.
OF NEW YORK PLAN]; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF WYO., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCfION PLAN 2 (1991), available in 1991 WL 525106 (C.J.R.A.) [hereinafter WYOMING PLAN]; see also Subrin, supra note 24, at 2020-26.
50. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 62.
51. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45; Telephone Interview
with Stephen N. Subrin, Consultant, Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992).
52. For example, a few districts experimented with coequal assignments of civil cases to
Article III judges and magistrate judges. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE D1sT. OF MoNT.,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCf!ON PLAN 3-4 (1991) [hereinafter MONTANA
PLAN]. See generally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MoNT. L. REv. 91,
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The Judicial Conference responded to the Local Rules Project's findings with an order that asked the federal districts to make all local
requirements consistent with the federal rules and that afforded other
helpful suggestions, such as proposing uniform numbering of the federal and local rules. 53 Not all districts have thoroughly implemented
the recommendations, however. 54
These developments, especially the rise of managerial judging
and the 1983 federal rules amendments, depart significantly from the
tenets that animated the drafters of the 1938 rules, changing and even
reversing the prior work. 55 Certain modifications might represent efforts to make the rules function as initially intended or to correct errors by instituting ideas that the Advisory Committee eschewed in the
1930s. 56 Additional alterations may constitute attempts to fill gaps in
the original rules or constitute new understandings. 57 Perhaps most
important, managerial judging and the 1983 revisions might be an acknowledgment that the uniform, simple, procedural regime that the
1938 rules implemented may be partly responsible for the perceived
explosion of litigation and litigation abuse.
c.

Concerns About Procedural Rule Revision Processes

During the last quarter century, many observers, including members of Congress, have expressed concerns about the processes for revising the requirements that cover federal practice, especially the civil
rules. In 1973, Congress intervened in the national rule amendment
process by enacting legislation that replaced the Federal Rules of Evi93 n.9 (1992). Some districts required that litigants make good faith efforts to resolve discovery
disputes before filing motions and to so certify in writing. See, e.g., WYOMING PLAN, supra note
49, at 13.
53. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45; Telephone Interview
with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 51. Neither the Project Director nor its Consultant believes
that there has been substantial nationwide compliance. Id.
54. This assertion is premised on the telephone conversations cited supra notes 45 and 51.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently adopted a Rule 83 amendment that requires consistent
numbering. See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (1995 amend.). Numerous districts have complied with the
Judicial Conference request that they consistently number local rules. Illustrative are the District of Minnesota and the Middle District of North Carolina. See RULES OF PRAcrrcE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (1996); RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLrNA (1998).
55. I rely most here on Subrin, supra note 15, at 1650-52. For example, revised Rules 11,
16, and 26 replaced attorney self-regulation with judicial control, while Rule 26 restricted openended discovery. Local proliferation eroded interfederal district court uniformity, and suggestions in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985) and Rule 16(b) that judges
develop prototypical scheduling orders for different types of cases have limited intercase uniformity. Similarly, the rise of managerial judging and its codification in Rule 16 exemplified
efforts to tailor procedures to particular cases, thus eroding the 1938 rules' transsubstantive
basis.
56. For example, Rule 16 could be an effort to have pretrial conferences restrict the scope
of, or expose, frivolous cases. The issue formulation provision institutes a concept like one Clark
suggested in 1935 but the Committee rejected. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 978-79.
57. This is true of Rule 16's allusion to settlement. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 496, 527.
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dence the Supreme Court had adopted the year before, thereby preempting much effort of Judicial Conference committees that had
developed the procedures. 58 During the following year, Congress intervened in another amendment process by delaying the effective date
of the revised Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure until 1975.59
This legislative activity led Professor Howard Lesnick to call for
reconsideration of the federal rule amendment processes in 1975.60
He suggested that there be serious inquiry and reexamination of those
processes' openness; of the Conference Committees' composition and
the centralization of authority for appointments in the Chief Justice of
the United States; of the propriety of the Court's role as promulgator
of rules; and of the meaningfulness of congressional review of rule
revisions. 61
During the mid-1970s, Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York gave several thought-provoking lectures on rule revision.62 Judge Weinstein described the historical development of
court rulemaking and offered numerous suggestions for improving the
national and local rule revision processes. 63 These included somewhat
reduced roles for certain participants, especially Congress and the
Supreme Court, changes in procedures for appointing various committee members, and more regularized processes for local procedural
revision. 64
During 1979, the Judicial Conference convened a convocation on
federal rulemaking and in 1981 the Conference issued a comprehensive report titled Federal Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities. 65
Although this effort may have been undertaken partly in response to
the developments described above, the specific impetus was Chief Justice Warren Burger's request for reexamination of the entire rulemaking process, particularly the Court's role in it. 66 The report thoroughly
58. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27-29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 598789; see also Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
59. See Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-Examination,
61 AB.A. J. 579, 579 (1975); see also Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397.
Congress thereafter often intervened to "delay the effective date of, disapprove, or modify rules
and amendments." See H.R. REP. No 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987.
60. See Lesnick, supra note 59.
61. See id. at 579-84.
62. See JACK WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977); see also
Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 905
(1976) (condensed version).
63. See Weinstein, supra note 62, at 911-43.
64. See id. at 927-57. Professor Geoffrey Hazard responded to Judge Weinstein and Professor Lesnick by suggesting that a Jess than fully democratic rule revision process produced better
proposals for procedural change than a more open process. See Geoffrey Hazard, Undemocratic
Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1287-94 (1978) (book review).
65. WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1981).
66. The Chief Justice's request appeared in his 1979 Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary. See BROWN, supra note 65, at vi.
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canvassed the existing revision process; criticisms and proposals for
change, including the structure of rule revision committees, the content of rules, and Congress's reviewing role; and specific proposals relating to structure and process. 67
Since the mid-1980s, there had been mounting criticism of the
1983 federal rule revisions, particularly of amended Rule 11. One important criticism was that the revisors premised Rule 11 's modification
on limited empirical data regarding the problems, such as the litigation explosion and litigation abuse, that it was intended to solve and
on the efficacy of the changes as a solution. 68 Another criticism reflected in the 1983 alteration, which has been publicly aired only during the 1990s,69 is that the rule revisors have been overly responsive to
the federal judiciary's needs and insufficiently solicitous of other users
of the federal courts, namely, lawyers and litigants. 70 Some critics
ascribe this phenomenon primarily to the rule amendment entities'
composition because the committees have consisted primarily of federal judges.71
Congressional interest in the rule revision processes and federal
civil procedure continued after the early 1970s. In 1977, Congress began holding hearings that eventually led to passage of the JIA. 72 During the early 1980s, Congress intervened significantly in the civil rule
revision process by rewriting a proposed amendment to Rule 4, governing service of process, that the Supreme Court had transmitted. 73
Many of the above developments culminated in congressional passage
of the JIA in 1988, although it is important to understand that the
legislation had a decade-long gestation period.
B.

The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988

Congress intended to respond to some criticisms of federal civil
procedure examined above when it passed the JIA. The requirements
67. See generally BROWN, supra note 65.
68. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925 (1989); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993).
69. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 897 (1992);
Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
17, 1992, at 15; John Frank, Rule 11-The Need to Start Over (May 1, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
70. See Tobias, supra note 69, at 897; Frank, supra note 69.
71. See Kaster & Wittenberg, supra note 69; Frank, supra note 69; see also Lesnick, supra
note 59, at 581-82. Other criticisms of Rule 11 were that it fostered satellite litigation and discouraged valid suits. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 69, at 860-63; Walker, supra note 68, at 456-59.
72. See H.R. REr. No. 100-889, at 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5983.
73. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat. 2527 (1983); see also Paul Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733 (1988) (describing prospects for reform of Rule 4). See generally
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 844-46 (1991). Criticism of the rule revision processes has
continued. See generally Burbank, supra note 68; Mullenix, supra; Walker, supra note 68.
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that the statute imposed and the legislative intent in enacting the measure are considered first. The second section of this article descriptively analyzes the JIA's implementation, as witnessed in the rule
revision process that yielded the 1993 federal rule amendments and in
efforts relating to local procedural change.
The advocates of the JIA meant to modernize, systematize, and
open the national and local processes for revising applicable procedures. The JIA's sponsors seemingly wished to restore the primacy of
the national rule amendment process and to restrict local procedural
proliferation. The proponents may also have intended to revitalize
several procedural precepts, namely, uniformity and simplicity, which
motivated the original Advisory Committee. 74
1.

National Rule Revision

Congress intended that the JIA open the national rule revision
process to enhanced public scrutiny and participation, thereby ostensibly improving the quality of procedural changes. 75 The legislation essentially assimilated federal rule amendment to notice-comment
rulemaking for federal administrative agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act. 76 The JIA provided for increased public involvement from the earliest phases of revisions' formulation.
The JIA prescribed enhanced public access to information that is
relevant to amendments, while requiring that meetings of certain rule
revision entities, particularly the Advisory Committee, be opened to
the public after notice is afforded. 77 The JIA also required that any
entity that makes a suggestion for procedural change "shall provide a
proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report
explaining the body's action, including any minority or other separate
views." 78 Moreover, the legislation afforded Congress several additional months to review revisions that the Supreme Court forwards, in
an apparent attempt to enhance that review's effectiveness. 79
74. Some JIA provisions, including its encouragement of experimentation with courtannexed arbitration, are not central to this article. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994); see also infra
text accompanying note 296 (stating that the 105th Congress authorized all districts to employ
court-annexed arbitration). See generally BARBARA s. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1990) (recommending Congress
enact an arbitration provision authorizing arbitration in all federal district courts to be
mandatory or voluntary or a combination of both). The JIA also prescribed creation of the
Federal Courts Study Committee and asked it to study comprehensively the federal courts and
issue a report. See Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988).
See generally REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990).
75. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987; see also
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994). See generally Mullenix, supra note 73, at 830-32.
76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994).
77. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073.
78. 28 u.s.c. § 2073(d).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 26, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987.
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Congress left essentially intact some aspects of the national rule
amendment process. All of the institutions-the Congress, the Court,
the Judicial Conference, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules
of Practice, Procedure and Evidence (Standing Committee), and the
Advisory Committee-that had traditionally been involved in rule revision continue to participate. Congress correspondingly decided to
retain the entities' existing composition, although it did consider possible change in the Advisory Committee's constitution. 80
2.

Local Rule Revision

Congress meant for the 1988 legislation to rectify or ameliorate
problems that expanding local procedures had engendered. Indeed,
the House Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the statute
stated that the Committee had "found a proliferation of local rules,
many of which conflict with national rules of general applicability." 81
The report also observed that the Judicial Conference was addressing
the "problem of proliferating local rules," while representatives
praised the Local Rules Project for its "valuable work" and remarked
on the Project's continuing efforts. 82
Congress attempted to limit local procedural proliferation principally by imposing restrictions on local procedural amendment that resembled those for federal rule revision. Senators and representatives
essentially intended these strictures to regularize local procedural
amendment and improve local procedures by opening local processes
to increased public involvement and scrutiny. The legislation commanded each federal district to appoint a local rules committee that
would assist all of the court's judges in developing local rules while
imposing public notice and comment requirements on courts that prescribe new, or amend existing, local rules. 83 Congress seemingly
meant for these mandates also to cover the procedures that individual
judges employ. 84 Congress correspondingly made exclusive the revision processes prescribed, thus attempting to guarantee that courts
and judges would not avoid them by attributing to local requirements
a different name, such as a standing or minute order. 85
An important way that senators and representatives sought to reduce local procedural proliferation was to impose specifically on circuit judicial councils an affirmative responsibility to review
80. The proposal would have required that advisory committees "consist of a balanced
cross section of the bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges." Paul D. Carrington, Making
Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-TransSubstantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2076 n.50 (1989).
81. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5988.
82. Id. at 28-29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5989.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). As with the national rule revision entities, Congress did
not prescribe committee composition. See also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 note.
85. See id. § 2071(f}; see also id. § 2071 note.
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periodically all local strictures for consistency with the federal rules
while permitting the councils to "modify or abrogate [all] procedures
found inconsistent. " 86 The JIA, therefore, assigned the councils a
continuing duty to monitor local procedures that existed when it took·
effect on December 1, 1988, and all procedures that are subsequently
prescribed. 87
In short, Congress intended that the JIA modernize, regularize,
and open the national and local procedural amendment processes
while restoring the primacy of national rule revision and limiting the
proliferation of local requirements. Congress, thus, apparently meant
to reinvigorate numerous procedural tenets, such as uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, that animated the drafters of the original federal rules in 1938. Before several of the Act's important
aspects, particularly those pertaining to local procedural revision and
proliferation, could be thoroughly implemented and before release of
the report of the Federal Courts Study Committee commissioned by
the 1988 legislation, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced an important bill that was the
predecessor of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. 88
C.

1.

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990

Background

The developments that led to the introduction of the measure
that eventually became the CJRA warrant comparatively thorough
examination here because they inform understanding of the statute
that Congress ultimately enacted. Treatment of that background in
this article is somewhat attenuated, however, as a number of writers
and entities have comprehensively considered the relevant history
elsewhere. 89
Concerns about growing expense and delay in civil litigation led
Senator Biden, the Foundation for Change, and the Brookings Institution to create a task force that was to evaluate the civil justice process
and make suggestions for improvement. 90 The task force, which included a broad spectrum of federal court users, undertook that assessment by scrutinizing the federal and state civil justice systems and
commissioning several surveys conducted by Louis Harris and
Associates.
86. Id. § 332(d)(4); see also id. § 2071 note.
87. See id. § 332(d)(4); see also id. § 2071 note.
88. S. 2648, lOlst Cong. (1990).
89. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 2; Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Summer 1991, at 105; Robel, supra note 2.
90. I rely substantially in this paragraph on BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING CosTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989). See also S. REP. No. 101-416, at 13-14
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6816.
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The task force ascertained that there was much dissatisfaction
among judges, attorneys, and parties with the federal civil justice process.91 The task force found that increasing cost and delay in resolving
civil litigation jeopardized open federal court access for numerous
people and organizations92 and proposed that the federal districts apply mechanisms, principally involving judicial case management, discovery, and ADR, to rectify or ameliorate these problems.93
Senator Biden relied substantially on the task force's suggestions
in drafting Senate Bill 2648,94 which he introduced in early 1990. The
bill, which would have required each federal district to implement a
number of mechanisms for decreasing cost and delay, proved to be
somewhat controversial. 95 Many federal judges had numerous concerns about the proposed legislation. The jurists were most troubled
because they considered the measure a congressional attempt to
micromanage the federal courts, which avoided the ordinary rule
amendment procedures, possibly threatening them and the efforts of
the Federal Courts Study Committee that Congress had commissioned, and which was introduced prior to adequate consultation with
the judges. 96 Indeed, the Judicial Conference responded to Senate
Bill 2648 with a "Fourteen-Point Plan." 97 After holding hearings, conducting delicate negotiations with the Conference, and revising the
legislation initially introduced, Congress passed the CJRA in November 1990. 98
The CJRA was, and remains, controversial for reasons mentioned
above and numerous others. A number of experts have challenged
the assertion that the federal courts have encountered troubling delay
in resolving civil cases. Thorough 1990 assessments showed that there
was less delay, especially in terms of time to disposition, than some
claimed. 99 Additional observers have suggested that, to the extent
that courts experience delay, the phenomenon varies considerably
from district to district. 100 A few critics assert that delay is a relative
91. See BROOKINGS INST., supra note 90, at 1-2, 5-7.
92. See id. at 5-7.
93. See id. at 8-29.
94. S. 2648, 101st Cong. (1990).
95. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 4-6, 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806-08,
6833-34; see also Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
D1sP. REsoL. 115, 128-29 (1991).
96. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 4-6, 10, 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806-08,
6813, 6833-34.
97. See id. at 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6833-34; see also Robel, supra
note 95, at 128-29.
98. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 3-6, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6805-08.
99. See TERENCE DUNWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF C1v1L
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990); WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990).
100. See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts,
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1991, at 99; see also Robel, supra note 95, at 117-23.

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET

No. 2]

563

notion. 101 For instance, although certain resource-poor litigants may
require more time for discovery to develop factual information important in proving their cases, it might be improper to describe this temporal need as delay that deserves remediation. 102 Other observers
claim that the statute was motivated too substantially by political considerations or was insufficiently responsive to critical sources of cost
and delay, mainly criminal dockets. 103
It is also important to understand that the 1988 and 1990 acts had
quite different origins, sponsors, and purposes, although both pieces
of legislation passed within a two-year time span. The JIA gestated
for nearly a decade, emanated from Representative Robert Kastenmeier's House Judiciary Subcommittee, and harkened back to the
tenets that underlie the 1938 federal rules. 104 Congress passed the
CJRA in less than a year, and it came from Senator Biden's Senate
Judiciary Committee and responded to concerns regarding the litigation explosion and litigation abuse, which find their clearest expression in the 1983 federal rule amendments. 105

2.

The CIRA

The CJRA commanded each federal district court to formulate a
civil justice expense and delay reduction plan by December 1993. 106
The plans' purposes were "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil
cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."107 The courts were to promulgate plans after scrutinizing
reports and recommendations that advisory groups prepared for the
districts. 108
These groups, which the districts named ninety days after adoption of the CJRA, were to be balanced and include attorneys and
other people representative of those who participate in civil litigation
in the trial courts. 109 The statute mandated that each group thor101.

See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 2; Robel, supra note 95, at 117-23; see also DUNWORTH

& PACE, supra note 99.

102. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure,
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992); see also Robel, supra note 95, at 121-22 (challenging relationship
between delay reduction and increased access to justice).
103. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 100, at 100-03; Mullenix, supra note 2, at 400-01; see also
David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 123 (1983)
(questioning whether litigation expenses are excessive).
104. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 25-29, 36-37, and accompanying text.
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b)(l)).
107. Id. § 471.
108. See id. § 472. See generally JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL
JusncE REFORM Acr IN P1LOT AND COMPARISON D1sTR1crs 13-26 (1996) [hereinafter RAND
PILOT STUDY]; Barb L. Bettenhausen, Revolution or Restoration? District Advisory Groups
Under the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act and the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 4 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 297 (1996).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 478(b).
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oughly evaluate the "state of the court's civil and criminal dockets,"
"identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on the
court's resources," and delineate the "principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation" in the district. 110 The CJRA also commanded
every group, when formulating suggestions, to consider the specific
needs and situations of the district, its parties, and their lawyers, while
insuring that all of them contribute significantly to "reducing cost and
delay and thereby facilitating access to the courts." 111
The districts, after receiving the groups' reports and recommendations, were to assess them and confer with the groups, and then
were to consider and could adopt the CJRA's eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques, and any other procedures that they deemed appropriate to reduce cost or delay under the legislation's twelfth openended provision.11 2 Section 473(a) of the CJRA affords six principles
and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction:
a system of case management tailored to each lawsuit's circumstances,
early judicial participation to create timelines, discovery conferences,
cooperative and voluntary discovery, strict limitations on discovery
motions, and enhanced reliance on ADR. 113 Section 473(b) provides
five techniques for managing litigation and decreasing expense and
delay: parties' joint presentation of a discovery case management
plan, litigant representation at each pretrial conference by counsel
with authority to bind a party regarding previously identified discussion topics, a signature requirement for all requests by attorneys or
parties for extension of deadlines for discovery completion and for
trial postponement, early neutral evaluation, and the presence or
availability by telephone of party representatives with binding settlement authority during settlement conferences upon court notice.11 4
None of the principles, guidelines, or techniques prescribed was
novel. Congress based the eleven measures primarily on the Brookings task force's recommendations, which in turn had been derived
principally from procedures that many federal districts and states had
applied or with which they had experimented. 115 For example, numerous districts had carefully monitored complex lawsuits and imposed
restrictions on discovery motions, 116 while trial courts in practically all
of the states had employed various forms of ADR. 117 These phenom110. Id. § 472(c)(l).
111. Id. § 472(c)(2)-(3).
112. See id. §§ 472(a), 473(a)-(b). See generally Bettenhausen, supra note 108, at 300.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a).
114. See id. § 473(b).
115. See BROOKINGS INST., supra note 90, at 23; supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., E. DIST. OF NEw YoRK PLAN, supra note 49, at 2; WYOMING PLAN, supra note
49, at 2; see also Subrin, supra note 24, at 2020-26; Edward D. Cavanagh, Congress' Failed Attempt to Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of the Civil Justice Reform Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25,
1996, at 28.
117. See supra note 38; see also Sherman, supra note 38.
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ena suggest, therefore, that the CJRA's purposes, language, and requirements were comparatively modest.
The districts that adopted and implemented plans prior to December 31, 1991, qualified for designation as Early Implementation
District Courts (EIDC), and the remaining courts had to promulgate
plans by December 1993.11 8 The CJRA also instructed the Judicial
Conference to identify ten districts, five of which served metropolitan
areas, as pilot districts.11 9 The CJRA required the ten courts to prescribe plans that included the six principles and guidelines of litigation
management and cost and expense reduction by December 31,
1991.1 2° Congress mandated that an "independent organization with
expertise in the area of Federal court management" evaluate the pilot
program and that the Judicial Conference submit to Congress a report
and suggestions respecting the principles and guidelines. 121
The CJRA concomitantly created a demonstration program in
which the Western District of Michigan and the Northern District of
Ohio were to experiment with differentiated case management
(DCM) while the Northern District of California, the Western District
of Missouri, and the Northern District of West Virginia were to experiment with a plethora of measures, including ADR, for decreasing
cost and delay. 122 The legislation required that the Judicial Conference assess the demonstration program and tender to Congress a report on it. 123
In addition to the prescribed evaluations, the CJRA established
institutions to oversee statutory implementation and assigned them
rather general responsibilities. For instance, the legislation instructed
circuit review committees, consisting of the chief circuit judge and all
of the chief district judges in every circuit, to review all expense and
delay reduction plans and advisory group reports and to make suggestions for additions or changes that the committee considered neces118.
119.

See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note
See id.; see also JAMES S.

(implementation of plans).

KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JusncE REFORM ACT 3-4, 15-18 (1996) [hereinafter RAND JCM
STUDY]; RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 5-9.

See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note; see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 471 note; see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE C1v1L JusTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1990 FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF CosT
AND DELA y ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND TECHNIQUES (1997), reprinted in 175
F.R.D. 62 (1997) (hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]; JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., JusT,
120.
121.

SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL JusncE REFORM ACT (1996) (hereinafter RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].

122. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (demonstration program); see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL.,
AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996) (analyzing ADR) [hereinafter RAND ADR STUDY].
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note; see also DoNNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JuDICIAL
CENTER REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND
CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED
UNDER THE CIVIL JusncE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997) (hereinafter FJC STUDY]; JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997).
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sary to limit cost and delay in civil actions. 124 The statute similarly
required the Judicial Conference to review each plan and report, while
empowering the Conference to request additional action if it determined that districts had inadequately responded to conditions on their
dockets or to their advisory groups' recommendations.125 The CJRA
also commanded all ninety-four districts to conduct annual assessments. It required that courts consult with their advisory groups in
analyzing the condition of the districts' criminal and civil dockets to
ascertain whether additional effective actions might be instituted to
decrease expense and delay and to improve the courts' litigation management practices. 126
In short, congressional passage of the 1990 CJRA was intended to
encourage widespread district court experimentation that would lead
to the discovery of efficacious procedures for reducing cost and delay
in civil litigation. The statute's sponsors envisioned that reform instituted "from the 'bottom up"' would promote the creative development of measures to decrease expense and delay while fostering
consensus among federal court users about optimal procedures and
productive exchange among those consumers. 127 Finally, the legislation's advocates apparently intended it to be a modest reform, especially in the sense that the statutorily prescribed measures were
premised substantially on mechanisms that many federal districts and
states had adopted or with which they were experimenting. The second section, which analyzes the CJRA's effectuation, finds that the
overwhelming majority of districts cautiously implemented the
statute.
II.

ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION

The CJRA's implementation, as witnessed in federal districts'
promulgation and application of civil justice plans, is inextricably intertwined with, and can be understood best by consulting, the JIA's
effectuation as manifested in the national revision process that led to
the 1993 federal rule amendments and in efforts meant to reform local
procedural revision and treat proliferation. Most pertinent, the national rule revisors apparently felt compelled to accommodate ongoing civil justice reform experimentation in certain important aspects of
the 1993 federal rule amendments, while those assigned responsibilities for limiting local procedural proliferation seemingly believed that
they must defer to this experimentation that essentially suspended
their work. 128
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
Friends,

See 28 U.S.C. § 474(a).
See id. § 474(b).
See id. § 475; see also RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23.
S. REP. No. 101-416, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806.
See Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
156 F.R.D. 295 (1994) (suggesting revisors felt compelled to accommodate CJRA); infra
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Congress predicated the JIA's passage on the accurate perception
that proliferating local procedures had undermined important tenets,
namely, uniformity and simplicity, and crafted the JIA in response to
this particular difficulty. 129 However, legislative concern over mounting cost and delay in civil lawsuits prompted Congress to prescribe
strictures in the CJRA that effectively discontinued implementation of
the JIA's features that were intended to reduce proliferation. Because the 1988 JIA's effectuation enhances comprehension of the
CJRA's implementation, the effectuation of the JIA is briefly
evaluated.
A.

The JIA

The assessment above suggests that requirements relating to local
procedural change that the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act imposed
have received comparatively little implementation. Therefore, this
limited effectuation is examined before considering the national rule
revision process, although both processes' implementation and that of
civil justice reform are interwoven.
1.

Local Rule Revision Processes

Nearly all of the ninety-four federal districts have now named local rules committees to advise the courts on the adoption and modification of local procedures, although some districts did not appoint the
entities before they prescribed CJRA expense and delay reduction
plans, and a few courts may even lack local advisory committees today .130 A small number of districts have regularized and opened to
public scrutiny processes for promulgating and amending local procedures, and certain courts have in fact adopted new, or revised existing,
local procedures pursuant to those processes. Very few local rules
committees were actively involved in implementing civil justice
reform. 131
An insignificant number of districts have apparently undertaken
actions to implement the JIA's requirements regarding local procenote 137 and accompanying text (suggesting those responsible for limiting proliferation believed
they must defer to experimentation).
129. See supra notes 18, 39-54, 81-87, and accompanying text.
130. For instance, the Eastern and Western Districts of North Carolina did not name local
rules committees before adopting plans. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF N.C., CIVIL
JusncE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5 (Oct. 1993); Letter from Sam Hamrick,
CJRA Analyst, U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to Carl Tobias
(Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with the author). The JIA imposed no requirements regarding committees' composition, so that certain committees may lack balance in terms of plaintiffs and defense
interests, political views, race, and gender. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. But cf
supra note 109 and accompanying text (requiring CJRA advisory groups to be balanced).
131. A few districts attempted to keep their committees involved or named committee
members to their advisory groups. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DIST. OF N.C., REPORT AND RECOMMENDED PLAN 111 (1992); see also Carl Tobias,
Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89, 108 (1993).
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dural proliferation. For instance, practically no courts have attempted
to restrict the number of local rules applicable in the districts, much
less instituted processes for monitoring individual judge procedures or
modified any local procedures deemed to conflict with the federal
rules or acts of Congress. 132
The circuit judicial councils, which the 1988 statute charged with
responsibility for periodically reviewing and abrogating or modifying
inconsistent local procedures adopted by districts or judges within the
councils' purview, 133 have attained little more success than the districts in discharging their monitoring duties. The Judicial Council of
the Seventh Circuit may be the sole council that has periodically evaluated local procedures prescribed by districts in the appeals court and
abolished or altered the requirements that the council found in conflict.134 However, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council has recently concluded a thoroughgoing review of local strictures prescribed in its
fifteen districts and has suggested that the courts abrogate or change
some procedures that it deemed inconsistent. 135
There are numerous reasons why the 1988 statute's requirements,
particularly pertaining to local procedural proliferation, received comparatively limited effectuation. Most significant, the CJRA of 1990
essentially discouraged efforts that the local rules committees and circuit councils might have undertaken to restrict proliferation by assigning overlapping responsibilities to federal districts and to the
institutions-advisory groups and circuit review committees-whose
creation the legislation prescribed. 136 For instance, local rules committees had little reason to prescribe local rules when advisory groups
and districts were developing new, possibly conflicting local requirements, while circuit review committees might have been understandably reluctant to review for inconsistency local rules that the CJRA
apparently authorized. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council
voted in 1994 to suspend additional review of local procedures that it
had earlier commenced, pending the receipt of greater guidance from
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law on whether the CJRA

132. See Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 51. Very few courts have
even implemented the analogous feature of Federal Rule 83's 1985 amendment. See supra notes
41·42 and accompanying text (discussing 1985 amendment to Rule 83).
133. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text; see also supra note 43 and accompanying
text (imposing similar duties in Rule 83's 1985 revision).
134. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45.
135. See DISTRICT LOCAL RULES REVIEW COMM., REPORT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CouNCIL: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1997). See generally Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1996); Carl Tobias, A Sixth Circuit Story, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
983, 988 (1996).
136. See supra notes 108-11, 124-25, and accompanying text.
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empowered districts to promulgate local procedur'es that conflicted
with the federal rules. 137
The intrinsic tension between the objective of national uniformity
and solicitude for local concerns may also explain why those features
of the JIA relating to local procedural proliferation have not received
particularly thorough effectuation. Federal district judges and local
rules committees, consisting of local attorneys, apparently have been
more concerned about the needs of local federal judges, lawyers, and
litigants than about preserving and revitalizing a national, uniform
procedural system. 138 For instance, some districts excluded attorneys
who were admitted to practice in states or districts other than those
districts because of discrepancies in local bar admission strictures. 139
It is important to understand, however, that the judges, local rules
committees, and circuit judicial councils that may have considered undertaking local procedural review for conflicts with the federal rules
and acts of Congress could have experienced difficulty in ascertaining
precisely what constituted inconsistency, especially between local procedures and the federal requirements.14° Moreover, Congress appropriated no funding for the district judges or these entities, which have
comparatively limited time and money for discharging numerous burdensome responsibilities, to complete the apparently resource-intensive, onerous duties regarding local proliferation that Congress
assigned. 141

2.

National Rule Revision Process
Implementation of the requirements that the JIA imposed on national rule amendment can be assessed by considering the revision
process that yielded the 1993 changes in the federal rules. This process was unusual in three important ways. First, it constituted the initial significant test of the mandates included in the 1988 statute.
Second, the set of modifications was probably the most ambitious
package of amendments formulated in the six-decade history of the

137. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 4-5 (May 4, 1994); see also Tobias, supra note
135.
138. Most local committees will be more solicitous than the Federal Advisory Committee of
local judges, counsel, and parties. See generally Marc S. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974). Many
writers agree that the Committee has much expertise, even if they disagree about its exercise.
See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 68; Carrington, supra note 73; Mullenix, supra note 73.
139. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 643, 650 (1987); see also Coquillette et al., supra
note 44, at 64. See generally SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS TO THE FED.
COURTS, NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS ON PRO HAc VICE ADMISSIONS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS, reprinted in 169
F.R.D. 390 (1996); Carl Tobias, Federal Court Procedural Reform, 52 MoNT. L. REv. 433, 436
n.14 (1991).
140. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 45; Telephone Interview
with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 51. See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 64.
141. See Tobias, supra note 135.
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federal rules. 142 Third, the rule revisors' perception that they must
accommodate ongoing civil justice reform experimentation mandated
by the CJRA may have made the rule amendment process extremely
unusual.1 43
Despite these circumstances, the process that led to the promulgation of the 1993 rule revisions warrants evaluation because analysis
informs understanding of the national amendment process and the
present status of the tenets and tensions involving the 1988 and 1990
statutes. The Advisory Committee effectuated the JIA by first proposing revisions in eighteen federal rules during 1991;144 however, that
entity and its changes to Rule 11 and in Rule 26 that impose automatic
disclosure are emphasized. The Advisory Committee was principally
responsible for formulating the two amendments that were the most
controversial modifications, and their examination increases comprehension of the basic procedural precepts, of inherent conflicts among
certain tenets, and of issues that are critical to harmonizing the JIA
and the CJRA.
Rule 11 particularly is addressed because its 1983 amendment
had proved to be the most controversial change in the civil rules' history and represented a failed effort to address perceived litigation
abuses that the open-ended, flexible procedural regime of the 1938
rules seemingly fostered. 145 The provision, accordingly, illustrates tensions between significant procedural precepts. The process from
which the 1993 revision resulted also typifies the kind of open rule
revision that Congress apparently envisioned in passing the JIA.
Automatic disclosure is emphasized because numerous respected
experts on federal civil practice currently think that a number of difficulties with discovery, such as discovery abuse, threaten civil litigation 146 and because the provision prescribing disclosure was probably
the most controversial formal proposal to change the rules ever developed. The 1993 amendment imposing disclosure shows how imple142. Evaluating the efficacy of the revisions that have been in effect for less than five years
could be premature. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Rule
23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 52 (1967) (citing former Advisory Committee Reporter's view that one-generation time frame is appropriate for evaluating efficacy of federal rule amendments); Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 677 (1979) (same).
143. See Carrington, supra note 128.
144. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft];
see also Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 1.
145. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77
IowA L. REv. 1775, 1775 (1992); Walker, supra note 68, at 455-59.
146. See, e.g., Committee on Discovery, New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on Discovery
Under Rule 26(b)(l), in 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579; Ralph K.
Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1392 (1994).
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mentation of the JIA's commands governing national rule revision
and congressional inability to reconcile the two statutes' effectuation
worsened local proliferation, additionally undermined national uniformity and simplicity, and increased cost and delay. The national
amendment process is initially afforded brief, general treatment. 147
a.

General Description

The national rule amendment institutions, particularly the entities
principally responsible for studying federal civil procedure and developing proposed modifications, appeared to implement efficaciously
and faithfully the strictures included in the JIA governing rule revision. They instituted amendment procedures that were premised substantially on the process of notice-comment administrative rulemaking
that federal agencies follow under the Administrative Procedure Act.
During August 1991, the Advisory Committee issued a preliminary draft of proposed amendments to eighteen federal rules. 148 It
requested and secured broad input from the public on the proposals in
writing and during two public hearings. 149 The Committee was quite
responsive to these public suggestions and attempted to improve the
proposed revisions, especially the changes that were most controversial. The Committee even reversed the ordinary sequence by soliciting public input on the prospect of revision before drafting a proposal
to modify Rule 11. 150
The other institutions in the rule amendment hierarchy made
only one major alteration in the Committee's ultimate work product
on Rule 11 and a small number of additional changes, thereby exhibiting deference to the Committee and to entities below them in that
hierarchy. 151 More specifically, the Supreme Court continued its practice of acceding to the expertise of these institutions and may have
deferred more substantially than ever. 152 Congress closely analyzed
the 1993 revisions, and the House of Representatives passed legislation that would have deleted automatic disclosure, but Congress permitted the whole set of amendments to take effect on December 1,
1993, by not acting. 153
147. I rely substantially in my treatment of amended Rules 11 and 26 on Carl Tobias, The
Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L. REv. 127 (1994).
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. See William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1993); Tobias, supra note 145, at 1778; see
also Tobias supra note 69, at 862-63.
150. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Advisory Comm. on the Civil Rules, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules as Amended
in 1983, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments].
151. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 185 (1994).
152. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND FoRMs, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 403 (1993) (submitting very deferential
transmittal letter) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS].
153. See Hughes, supra note 149, at 2.
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b. Specific Amendments
i. Amended Rule 11
The Rule 11 revision process was replete with ironies, which reflect back on the 1938 tenets. 154 The Advisory Committee published a
preliminary draft proposal to revise the 1983 amendment a mere eight
years after the rule revisors had substantially modified the provision.
The Committee's preliminary draft unfortunately did not treat numerous difficulties, such as satellite litigation and chilling effects, that the
1983 modification of Rule 11 imposed. 155
Few interests that the proposal would have affected were satisfied
with it. For example, the imposition of a continuing duty to withdraw
small fragments of papers when they lost merit and the possibility of
having to pay large monetary sanctions discouraged parties with limited resources. 156 The express inclusion of denials as components of
papers that must comply with the rule and the reduced prospect of
securing attorney's fees for rule violations bothered defense counsel.157 The lack of clarity in the proposal's wording troubled many
attorneys and litigants. 158 A number of individuals and groups criticized the preliminary draft, although the Advisory Committee thoroughly evaluated the 1983 amendment, solicited and closely examined
significant public input on the prospect of amendment before suggesting change, and carefully drafted a proposal that it thought would
be responsive to the needs of everyone involved in federal civil
litigation. 159
The Advisory Committee crafted several new drafts of the initial
proposal, which meant that the final version that it prepared in May
1992 for the Standing Committee constituted a significant improvement. For example, this iteration substantially narrowed the continuing duty and parsed less finely the idea of a paper. 160 The changes in
the first draft could be ascribed to the Committee's conscientious examination of much written public comment, consideration of oral input at several public hearings, and writing of the fairest, clearest, most
efficacious revision conceivable. 161 The Committee's work in devel154. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra note 135; Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 236.
155. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 236; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 862-65. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 475, 484-86 (1991).
156. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 237. See generally Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights
Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89); Vairo, supra note 155, at 484-86.
157. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 237. See generally Vairo, supra note 155, at 495-500.
158. See Tobias, supra note 154, at 238; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 894-95; Vairo,
supra note 155, at 495-500.
·
159. See Tobias, supra note 69, at 861-65; see also Call for Comments, supra note 150, at 345.
160. Compare Tobias, supra note 69, at 866-71 (discussing the continuing duty in the preliminary draft), with FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (1993 amendment). See also FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1993 amendment); Tobias, supra note 147, at 137.
161. See Tobias, supra note 151; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 859-65.
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oping the final draft represented the type of open, responsive revision
and reasoned decision making that Congress envisioned in changing
the rule amendment process in the 1988 statute. 162
Notwithstanding the improvements in the Rule 11 proposal and
the Committee's gargantuan efforts, certain critics continued opposing
the 1983 provision's amendment. 163 The most prominent among these
observers was Justice Antonin Scalia, who authored a vociferous dissent to the Supreme Court's transmittal of amended Rule 11. 164 The
dissent contended that promulgation of revised Rule 11 would "eliminate a significant and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation" and
argued that the amendment would make Rule 11 toothless because it
would give judges discretion to levy sanctions, disfavor compensation
for litigation costs, and provide safe harbors which allow parties that
contravene the provision to avoid sanctions altogether. 165 Despite
these criticisms, those entities responsible for amending the rules,
whose membership then consisted principally of federal judges, appeared to think that a stricter revision's possible disadvantages,
namely satellite litigation and chilling meritorious cases, overrode its
benefits, such as discouraging frivolous lawsuits. 166
Federal judges' support for amending Rule 11 appeared important to congressional consideration of the revision that the Court
transmitted. Most members of Congress seemed to find that they
could not improve on many features of the rule changes forwarded. 167
These modifications represented the well-informed opinion of the rule
revision institutions and their expert advisers or constituted the most
efficacious means of responding to the myriad factual situations that
Rule 11 addresses. For instance, the amendment employed words,
such as "reasonable" and "likely," which are the clearest, fairest

162. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. See generally Walker, supra note 68.
163. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 151, at 186-87.
164. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 507-10 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also id., reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 419-24 (1993) (transmitting revised Rule
11).
165. Id. at 507-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Tobias, supra note 151, at 186-87 (affording
additional analysis of dissent).
166. See Tobias, supra note 151, at 188.
167. Illustrative was Representative William Hughes (D-N.J.), Chair of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee with responsibility for monitoring rule revision, who deferred to the federal judiciary because he found much support for revision and for limiting the satellite litigation fostered
by the 1983 rule. See Federal Courts: Bill to Delete Discovery Rule Reported to House Committee, Daily Rep. for Executives, Reg., Econ. and Law (BNA) (Aug. 6, 1993), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNABUS File. Other members of Congress evinced less deference, introducing
bills that would have postponed the amendment's effective date for one year. See H.R. 2979,
103d Cong. (1993) (delaying effective date of the proposed amendments to Rule 11); S. 1382,
103d Cong. (1993) (same); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. (1993) (permitting certain proposed
rules of civil procedure with modifications to take effect).
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phrasing that can treat the inherently fact-specific questions implicated by sanctions motions. 168
The amendment process was responsive to the complications engendered by the 1983 revision and to public comment, producing a
balanced change in Rule 11. For example, the 1993 revision significantly decreased the incentives to invoke the provision by affording
safe harbors and by empowering judges to exercise discretion in
choosing whether to sanction and in selecting appropriate sanctions.169 The Advisory Committee correspondingly deleted some burdensome requirements from the preliminary draft, such as the
continuing duty. 170 The revisors reduced incentives for invoking Rule
11 and the Committee omitted these onerous requirements, despite
remaining concerns about deterring frivolous litigation that Justice
Scalia articulated. 171
The rule revision entities, however, retained some incentives for
employing Rule 11. For instance, revised Rule 11 permits judges to
award litigants who file Rule 11 motions the expenses of prevailing
and to impose sanctions of attorney's fees in certain circumstances. 172
The revisors concomitantly used unclear or very general phrasing,
such as "nonfrivolous" and "appropriate sanctions," which will inevitably promote inconsistent interpretation and satellite litigation. 173
In short, the new Rule 11 may have been imperfect, but it greatly
improved the 1983 version and was much better than the Advisory
Committee's first draft. The 1993 rule should also decrease incentives
to employ Rule 11, reduce cost and delay ascribed to satellite litigation, and limit chilling effects. Moreover, the amendment was a feasible compromise in light of the daunting restraints under which the
rule revisors labored, such as the importance of satisfying the different
constituencies affected by the provision.
Perhaps the best explanation for Rule ll's 1993 revision is that
many judges apparently found that the 1983 provision had achieved as
much as could reasonably be attained by encouraging attorneys and
litigants to undertake reasonable prefiling inquiries and by discouraging pursuit of frivolous cases. The revision entities might also have
determined that the provision's rigorous application could not support
the expenditure of scarce resources of judges, attorneys, and parties
168. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(a)-(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21; see also Tobias, supra
note 145, at 1791. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,
93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
169. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra note
145, at 1783-88.
170. See Tobias, supra note 151, at 192-96; see also Tobias, supra note 69, at 866-71.
171. See supra notes 165-66, 169, and accompanying text.
172. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra note
145, at 1787-88.
173. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll(a)-(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21; see also Tobias, supra
note 151, at 196-201, 209-14.
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on satellite litigation that the rule entails. Important as well may have
been the perception among judges, counsel, and parties that discovery
was a larger difficulty with civil litigation that required more reform
and had greater prospects for actual improvement.
ii.

Amended Rule 26

The process of amending Federal Rule 26 to prescribe automatic
disclosure was similarly ironic. 174 The Advisory Committee seemed to
forget the troubling results of its 1983 revision of Rule 11. Even
though the Committee had very limited empirical data on how the
1938 Rule 11 operated, the Committee significantly changed the original rule, and this 1983 modification ultimately became the most controversial revision in the rules' half-century history. 175
Notwithstanding the dearth of empirical information showing the
existence of much discovery abuse, the difficulty that disclosure primarily addresses, 176 and the lack of experimentation with, and assessment of, automatic disclosure, 177 the Advisory Committee published a
preliminary draft during 1991 that might have significantly altered the
process of discovery. 178 The draft would have mandated that plaintiffs
and defendants disclose prior to discovery much material that was
likely to bear "significantly on any claim or defense." 179 The Committee published the proposal, although virtually no federal districts had
experimented with automatic disclosure, 180 two of disclosure's earliest
proponents had recommended that a national rule be adopted only
after much testing, 181 and congressional passage of the CJRA demonstrated legislative concern that experimentation occur before discovery underwent great change. 182 Of the some twenty districts that
issued civil justice plans by December 31, 1991, to qualify for designation as Early Implementation District Courts (EID Cs) under the
CJRA, and that decided to impose disclosure, practically all depended
174. I rely substantially in this subsection on Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil
Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993); Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The
Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992); Tobias, supra note 147; Winter, supra note 146.
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also Burbank, supra note 68, at 1927-28
(suggesting little empirical data on 1938 version's operation).
176. See Mullenix, supra note 146, at 1432; Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse?, 69
B.U. L. REV. 649, 653 (1989).
177. A mere three federal districts had experimented with disclosure. See Bell et al., supra
note 174, at 17-18; Mullenix, supra note 73, at 810, 813-21.
178. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 144, at 87.
179. Preliminary Draft, supra note 144, at 87-88.
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
181. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 V AND. L. REv. 1295, 1361 (1978); William W Schwarzer, The Federal
Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. P1rr. L. REV. 703, 723 (1989).
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994). See generally Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1993).
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heavily on the phrasing included in the Committee's preliminary
draft.183
No formal rule amendment proposal has received so much criticism from such a broad spectrum of federal court users. 184 Over the
course of a half-year comment period and during public hearings, numerous elements of the organized bar and many additional interests
opposed the proposal because it lacked clarity, could have imposed
another layer of discovery, involved ethical problems, and would increase costs. 185 Upon conclusion of the February 1992 Atlanta hearing on the 1991 set of proposed amendments, the Advisory
Committee responded to this groundswell of public opposition by jettisoning the automatic disclosure preliminary draft and apparently deferring to experimentation with disclosure under the CJRA that was
being conducted in numerous districts. 186 The Committee seemed to
think for a short time that experimentation with the disclosure mechanism in local districts was better than national application of the relatively untested and controversial mechanism. 187
Less than two months thereafter, the Advisory Committee reversed its earlier view, absent additional public input and without explanation.188 Six members of the Committee, at the instigation of
Second Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, a persuasive proponent of automatic disclosure, 189 convinced the rest to reevaluate the issue. 190 At
an April 1992 session of the Committee, members resurrected the proposal, imposing the basic requirements that litigants disclose "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity
in the pleadings" and "all documents, data compilations and tangible
things" having such relevance. 191 The Committee also authorized districts to vary the disclosure requirements in the federal provision or
eschew them totally, which seemingly was an effort to accommodate
ongoing civil justice reform experimentation. 192
183. See, e.g., MONTANA PLAN, supra note 52, at 15-16; E. DIST. OF NEW YORK PLAN, supra
note 49, at 4-5; cf Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56
(1992) (listing 34 EIDCs); see also 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (prescribing EIDCs); Preliminary Draft,
supra note 144, at 87 (presenting Committee's early draft).
184. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, 146 F.R.D. at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Accord
Bell et al., supra note 174, at 28-32; Ann Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share: Judges Back Radical Discovery Rule, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, at 1.
185. See Tobias, supra note 174, at 141; Bell et al., supra note 174, at 28-32.
186. See Bell et al., supra note 174, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 146, at 268; Randall
Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 1.
187. See Bell et al., supra note 174, at 34-35; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12.
188. See Bell et al., supra note 174, at 35.
189. See Winter, supra note 146, at 268.
190. See Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at
6; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12.
191. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 431.
192. See 146 F.R.D. at 431-32; see also Bell et al., supra note 174, at 35-39; Carrington, supra
note 128. But see Winter, supra note 146, at 269.
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Justice Scalia's dissent from transmittal of the disclosure revision
observed that the Committee might have found too prolonged the
CJRA's schedule for experimentation, "preferring instead to subject
the entire federal judicial system at once to an extreme, costly, and
essentially untested revision of a major component of civil litigation. "193 The Committee members voiced a principled defense of the
determination to change course two times within six weeks. They asserted that discovery was not operating efficaciously, that maintaining
the status quo was not acceptable, and that the bar's self-interest precluded constructive change. 194 The Committee seemed to understand
that the protracted three-year rule amendment process imposed in the
JIA meant that its withdrawal of the disclosure proposal would have
essentially postponed judicially required discovery reform for much of
the 1990s. 195 Some observers even described the about-face as a desperate attempt to prevent the erosion of the judiciary's influence on
procedure by congressional statutes, namely, the CJRA, and executive
branch civil justice reform efforts, such as Executive Order 12,778. 196
The other institutions in the rule amendment hierarchy approved
the Committee proposal, despite mounting criticism, especially from
the bar. The Supreme Court transmitted the disclosure revision without modification, although three Justices dissented. 197 A majority of
the Court apparently considered the core concept of disclosure sufficiently important and workable and the need for discovery reform so
critical that transmittal was warranted. Justice Scalia penned an
acerbic dissent in which he asserted that the disclosure revision "adds
a further layer of discovery" and "does not fit comfortably within the
American judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a neutral decisionmaker. " 198
Once the Court had transmitted the amendment, virtually every
segment of the bar and numerous other interests, encompassing individuals and entities as diverse as civil rights plaintiffs and corporations, attempted to convince Congress to eliminate the disclosure
revision. In the summer of 1993, the House and Senate Judiciary
193. AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. See Pelham, supra note 190, at 6; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12; see also Bell et al.,
supra note 174, at 35-39. The last observation illuminates another irony. Much of the organized
bar seemed to oppose the disclosure proposal and to agree that many problems attend modern
discovery. See Pelham, supra note 190, at 6; Samborn, supra note 186, at 12; see also Winter,
supra note 146.
195. Had Congress omitted disclosure, the revisors would have had to recommence the
three-year process. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994); see also Samborn, supra note 186, at 12.
196. See Samborn, supra note 186, at 12; see also Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359
(1992), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. See generally Tobias, supra note 102 (describing congressional reforms); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521
(1993) (describing executive initiatives).
197. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431 (1993); id. at 507,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id., reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 510-11 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

578

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1998

Committees conducted hearings on automatic disclosure. 199 Representative William J. Hughes, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Court Administration and Intellectual Property, guided
through the House legislation that would have deleted disclosure, and
the House passed it by voice vote on November 3, 1993. 200 The Senate surprisingly failed to adopt the measure at the eleventh hour
before recessing, principally because civil rights organizations, plaintiffs' trial lawyers, and numerous defense counsel and defense interests could not craft a satisfactory compromise that would have
accommodated their concerns about the amendments governing disclosure, Rule 11, and presumptive discovery limitations. 201
During the period immediately after the Senate recessed without
passing the bill, there was much confusion and uncertainty in many of
the ninety-four districts, particularly those fifty courts that were hurrying to satisfy the December 1, 1993, deadline by which the CJRA
mandated that they adopt civil justice plans and on which the federal
disclosure requirements became effective.202 Because numerous
courts expected Congress to reject the federal disclosure amendment
and failed to implement other options, the districts had to adopt lastminute alternatives. Threats to revitalize the disclosure bill, which
persisted even after Congress reconvened in late January 1994, worsened the ongoing confusion. 203
These courts and most of the EIDCs, many of which in 1991 had
instituted variations of automatic disclosure that conflicted with the
new federal amendment, 204 implemented a plethora of actions. A
substantial number of the districts issued or revised civil justice plans,
adopted general and special orders, and published new, or changed
existing, local rules. 205 Numerous non-EIDCs opted out, totally eschewing the new federal revision. They prescribed provisions that departed from the federal strictures or discontinued application of the
federal amendment until their judges, advisory groups or bars, or
Congress could evaluate that procedure. 206 Some EIDCs maintained
different variations of automatic disclosure, which in turn conflicted
199. See Hughes, supra note 149, at 3-4, 9-10.
200. See 139 CoNG. REc. H8745-47 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993); see also Hughes, supra note 149,
at 10; Randall Sambom, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3.
201. See Sam born, supra note 200, at 3; see also Randall Sambom, Derailing the Rules,
NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993, at 1 (analyzing diverse coalition that lobbied Congress). For example,
civil rights groups refused to compromise on amended Rule 11, while the plaintiffs' bar would
not separate disclosure and presumptive limits.
202. See Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure: Let It Be, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at 25; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994) (implementation of plans) (affording statutory deadlines).
203. This assertion is premised on telephone conversations with numerous individuals who
are familiar with the legislative machinations.
204. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
205. A few even relied on the Rules Enabling Act's emergency clause. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071(e). See, e.g., S.D. IND. R. 26.3 (invoking emergency clause); D. Mo. R. 104.1 (same).
206. See, e.g., D. ME. R. 18(g); E.D. LA. R. 6.06E (amended Dec. 1, 1993); see also DONNA
STJENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
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with the federal revision, or continued to reject disclosure completely.207 Nearly a majority of the districts ultimately chose not to
apply the federal requirements. 208
Senate inability to pass the bill eliminating disclosure and this activity led to considerable complication and consternation in many
courts. For example, numerous attorneys and parties encountered
problems finding all of the applicable procedures, determining which
measures in fact governed and when they took effect, and understanding and complying with the new strictures. 209 The application of inconsistent requirements complicated participation in federal civil
litigation for counsel and entities, such as government lawyers and
public interest groups that litigate in multiple districts, and tested the
patience of judges and attorneys for conflicting procedures. 210
After the districts charted, instituted, and publicized particular
courses of action to address automatic disclosure, the circumstances
clarified and stabilized, and most judges, counsel, and clients seemingly became accustomed to the applicable procedures. 211 Numerous
districts had attained a measure of clarity and certainty by the conclusion of 1993, and nearly all of the remaining districts had ameliorated
the complications by mid-1994. 212
The above assessment of automatic disclosure's effectuation suggests that the experience eroded uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, while increasing cost and delay. Disclosure's actual application in numerous specific cases has apparently had analogous impacts. For example, the inexact nature of the information that parties
are to reveal and disclosure's imposition of another discovery layer
mean that disclosure has increased expense, and perhaps delay, in a
number of circumstances. 213
CouRTS (1996); John Flynn Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, Is "Source of Confusion": Critics, Cm. DAILY L. BuLL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17.
207. See, e.g., Order of the United States District Court of Montana (Jan. 25, 1994); Order of
the United States District Court of the Northern District of Georgia (Feb. 26, 1994).
208. See SnENSTRA, supra note 206, at 4-5; see also Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Half
of Districts Opt out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5; Rooney, supra note 206.
209. See Tobias, supra note 202.
210. The CJRA Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York urged the rule revisors to observe a "three-year moratorium on affected national rules so that each district can have
a fair opportunity to assess reforms at the local level." Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair,
Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York, to Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 3, 1992)
(on file with author); see also Samborn, supra note 186, at 1. See generally Stephen B. Burbank,
Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 856
(1993).
211. These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with the
circumstances in numerous districts.
212. These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with the
circumstances in numerous districts.
213. The assertions in this paragraph are premised on conversations with numerous individuals familiar with disclosure and civil justice reform. See also infra notes 220-23 and accompany-
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It may be premature to posit definitive conclusions about
whether any-or which-of the differing automatic disclosure measures are efficacious. A minuscule number of courts that implemented
disclosure for the longest period have applied strictures analogous to
the new federal revision, and the districts might not have experimented with, much less evaluated, the technique for sufficient time to
yield very conclusive assessments regarding efficacy. 214
Early anecdotal information indicated that some EIDCs encountered few problems employing the mechanism, particularly in comparatively simple lawsuits or when the disclosure was highly
generalized. 215 Additional anecdotal information showed that lawyers
and litigants who have had experience with automatic disclosure could
comply rather easily because disclosure effectively demanded their
earlier involvement in certain activities, especially document retrieval
and labeling. 216 Disclosure, by requiring early automatic exchange of
important information, may save resources, for example, that might
have been expended on formal discovery and could expedite settlement. The RAND Corporation's study of automatic disclosure's application in the pilot and comparison districts unfortunately proved to
be equally inconclusive as the earlier assessments of the procedure.
Although RAND undertook a carefully controlled, well-defined analysis, it ascertained that disclosure had no measurable impact on cost
or delay in civil litigation. 217
ing text (suggesting provision in specific cases for judicial modification or litigant stipulation
additionally erodes uniformity and simplicity and increases cost and delay).
214. Most of the EIDCs only implemented disclosure during 1992, and few rigorously analyzed its efficacy. See Tobias, supra note 147, at 144-45; Samborn, supra note 186, at l; see also
1994 CIVIL JusncE REFORM Acr ADVISORY GROUP OF THEE. DIST. OF N.Y. ANN. REP. 3, 5-8
(affording valuable assessment reflecting ambivalence about disclosure's efficacy).
215. These included the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona, Massachusetts, and Montana. This evidence was derived from conversations with many individuals
who are familiar with civil justice reform in those districts. See also Carl Tobias, More on Federal
Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REv. 357, 363 (1993); Samborn, supra note 186, at
12. Discovery is most problematic and requires the most efficacious disclosure in complex lawsuits and when litigants need specific information. These ideas are premised on the conversations supra. Accord Bell et al., supra note 174, at 39-42; Winter, supra note 146, at 268.
216. These ideas are premised on the conversations supra note 215. See also Samborn,
supra note 186, at 1.
217. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 17; see also James S. Kakalik et
al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39
B.C. L. REv. 613, 679 (1998) (affording further analysis of disclosure finding "no strong evidence
that a policy of early mandatory disclosure reduced lawyer work time or time to disposition");
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 534-35 (1998) (affording further analysis of
discovery finding attorneys' perception that disclosure decreased expense and delay and that
actual disposition times corroborated finding regarding delay). These results are disappointing
because the 1993 federal disclosure provision afforded courts sufficient flexibility to experiment
with many disclosure schemes that appeared adequate in number and diverse enough to provide
a sense of the measure's efficacy. Moreover, many districts instituted measures for evaluating
the disclosure techniques' efficacy. See, e.g., 1993 ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRicr
COURT FOR THE E. DISTRicr OF p A. ANN. REP. 6-8; REPORT ON THE IMPAcr OF THE CosT AND
DELAY REDUcrION PLAN ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRicr COURT FOR THE SOUTH-
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In short, the debate involving disclosure's effectiveness cannot be
conclusively resolved today; however, the technique apparently operates most efficaciously in limited, discrete contexts. Disclosure's effectuation clearly tested the tolerance for confusion and inconsistency of
judges, attorneys, and parties, while undermining uniformity and simplicity and increasing cost and delay.

iii.

A Miscellany of Procedures

The package of proposals in the Advisory Committee's August
1991 preliminary draft included other measures that require comparatively terse treatment because they involve issues that are less important to this article. The rule revisors omitted or withdrew a few of
these proposals over the course of the revision process, while additional ones were components of the 1993 amendments that became
effective on December 1, 1993.
The most significant proposal that did not take effect was a
change in Rule 83, which would have prescribed local procedural experimentation. The proposal authorized districts with Judicial Conference approval to adopt for not greater than five years experimental
local rules that conflict with federal rules. 218 The Advisory Committee's withdrawal of the proposal, out of deference to continuing CJRA
experimentation, led to the loss of a valuable means of carefully balancing the need for experimentation to discover effective measures
with the difficulties, such as expense, which inconsistent local procedures can foster. 219
The 1993 revisions that imposed presumptive numerical limitations on interrogatories and depositions are also relevant to the issues
examined in this article. 220 The provisions, which permit local variation and allow judges and parties to change the procedures in particular lawsuits, resemble, and have effects analogous to, the federal
automatic disclosure amendment. 221 For instance, the strictures covering presumptive limits on depositions and interrogatories have
prompted a number of courts to opt out of, or to modify, the federal
requirements, thereby undermining uniformity and simplicity and increasing cost and delay. 222 A few changes in Rule 16 governing preERN D1sTR1cr OF TEXAS, available in 1993 WL 468314 (C.J.R.A.), at *7-9 (Apr. 6, 1993); see also
28 u.s.c. § 475 (1994) .
. 218. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 144, at 152.
219. Compare id. with The Judicial Conference of the United States Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, at Table of Contents (1992) (deleting proposed amendment of Rule 83).
220. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A), 33(a).
221. Presumptive limits raise issues analogous to automatic disclosure. Most important is
the provision in specific cases for judicial modification and litigant stipulation.
222. See, e.g., Order of the United States District Court of Montana (Jan. 25, 1994) (maintaining current local rule imposing presumptive limit on interrogatories that departs from Federal Rule until the district formally reviews its Civil Justice Delay Reduction Plan); General
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trial conferences, which allow local option in certain circumstances
and alteration of time restraints in individual cases, could have similarly reduced uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and increased expense. 223
In sum, the JIA's strictures covering local procedural amendment
and proliferation received little effectuation because the CJRA essentially discontinued implementation. Effectuation of the JIA's requirements relating to national rule revision, as manifested in Federal Rule
ll's 1993 modification, exemplifies the kind of amendment process
that Congress seemingly contemplated when passing the JIA and illustrates the tensions between important procedural precepts. The 1988
legislation's implementation, as witnessed in the provision prescribing
automatic disclosure, demonstrates how the JIA's strictures, and congressional failure to reconcile them with the CJRA's requirements,
exacerbated local proliferation, additionally eroding national uniformity and simplicity and imposing greater cost and delay.
B.

Implementation of the CJRA

In this subsection, certain disadvantages that attended the
CJRA's implementation are initially considered. For instance, difficulties involved the entities that the CJRA assigned responsibility for
effectuating the legislation, for monitoring that implementation, and
for evaluating the efficacy of procedures in reducing expense and delay that the ninety-four districts applied. Legislative provision for nationwide experimentation, internal statutory inconsistency, and the
CJRA's encouragement of districts to prescribe conflicting strictures
correspondingly undermined uniformity and simplicity while increasing cost and delay. The subsection then analyzes positive features of
the CJRA's effectuation, emphasizing those experimental measures
that saved expense or time. It concludes with lessons derived from the
seven-year effort. Throughout the evaluation, the EIDCs' experience
is stressed because the thirty-four courts experimented much longer
and their work received considerably more assessment. Many of the
remaining sixty districts concomitantly adopted mechanisms that replicated or resembled those that the EIDCs prescribed.

Order No. 40 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York in the
Matter of Local Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 14, 1993).
223. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 427-28 (1993) (text of
amended Rule 16(b) as transmitted by the Supreme Court); see also id. at 478-79 (demonstrating
that 1993 amendment to Rule 54(d)(2)(B) and (D) similarly prescribed local option); D. Mo. R.
104.1; S.D. IND. R. 26.3.
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Detrimental Aspects
a.

Relevant Entities

i.

Implementing Entities

Congress meant for the CJRA to assemble a broad spectrum of
interests in the districts that would develop from the bottom up innovative expense and delay reduction procedures that would be responsive to all involved in civil litigation.224 However, Congress selected
instrumentalities to implement the statute and assigned them responsibilities that eroded uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity and
increased cost and delay, partly by encouraging the proliferation of
local procedures.
The CJRA required that judges in each district promulgate a civil
justice plan after considering a report and recommendations prepared
by an advisory group. 225 The legislative mandate that chief district
judges name the entities, the groups as selected, and the CJRA's commands as effectuated had impacts that undermined the basic tenets.
Some groups lacked balance, including, for example, large numbers of
defense interests or insufficient representatives of those having few
resources. 226 The statutory command that each group consider its district's needs and situation in assembling the report and suggestions
apparently prompted a number of groups to develop recommendations that evinced more solicitude for local judges, attorneys, and parties than for national uniformity and simplicity, and that varied
significantly. 227
· u.

Monitoring Entities

Congress designated entities to oversee CJRA effectuation and
assigned them comparatively generalized, unclear responsibilities that
substantially limited the possibility that the instrumentalities would
meaningfully treat the inconsistency and complexity that the statute
224. See supra notes 106-14, 127, and accompanying text.
225. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-472 (1994); see also supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP SOUTHERN DISTRI= OF
INDIANA I.A (1991) (more defense counsel); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM A= ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DISTRI= COURT FOR THE DISTRI= OF MONTANA frontispiece
(1991) (few resource-poor litigants) [hereinafter MONTANA REPORT]. See generally RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 18-19; Bettenhausen, supra note 108, at 300; Galanter, supra note
138, at 97-119.
227. This may seem too instrumental. I am merely saying that the groups were less expert
and less concerned about maintaining national uniformity and simplicity than the Federal Advisory Committee. A few groups suggested that their districts more strictly enforce local procedures. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF CAL., CrvIL JusT1cE ExPENSE AND
DELAY REDU=ION PLAN 3 (1991); U.S. DIST. & BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DIST. OF
IDAHO, EXPENSE AND DELAY REDU=ION PLAN 1 (1991) [hereinafter IDAHO PLAN]. See generally RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 19-20, 24-26.
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fostered. 228 For instance, few circuit review committees critically analyzed, much less suggested alterations in, civil justice expense and delay reduction plans, partly because chief district judges were
apparently unwilling to analyze procedures prescribed by additional
district judges in their appeals courts with whose districts they might
have lacked farniliarity. 229 Some districts even failed to institute recommendations for modifications tendered by those circuit review
committees that did perform rigorous oversight. 230 Judicial Conference scrutiny was even less stringent for similar reasons that involved
the reviewing entity's constitution and the unclear, weaker duties that
Congress gave the Conference. 231
Congress discharged its monitoring responsibilities no more rigorously than circuit review committees or the Conference. Congress
had the same obligation to oversee the CJRA as with any substantive
legislation that it enacts. However, Congress may have assumed
greater responsibility for monitoring the CJRA because, for instance,
Congress instructed the Conference and the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts to furnish it material on the results of statutory implementation. 232 Nonetheless, Congress apparently undertook
minimal review of the legislation's effectuation and never conducted
oversight hearings.
Several reasons may explain legislative reluctance to scrutinize
CJRA implementation rigorously. 233 Congress's stake in the perceived success of the statute probably meant that it had a conflict of
interest. Congress also might have deferred to the decisions of the
districts in prescribing procedures or to the monitoring institutions
that it established, while Congress could have wished to preserve cordial ongoing relationships with the federal bench. Moreover, Congress was preoccupied by many other important responsibilities.
Insofar as Congress was tracking CJRA effectuation, the 1994
congressional elections probably disrupted, and even halted, this activity. The legal reform proposals-principally relating to securities
litigation, product liability, and procedural changes-included in the
Contract with America, which were essentially intended to restrict
court access, had a quite different focus than the CJRA. 234 These pro228. The instrumentalities are circuit review committees, the Judicial Conference, and Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 474. The Conference Committee on Case Management and Court Administration had primary responsibility for Conference review.
229. See Tobias, supra note 102, at 1407-08.
230. For example, the Montana District did not adopt the Ninth Circuit Review Committee's suggestions on local procedures. See Minutes of Telephone Conference of the Ninth Circuit Civil Justice Reform Act Review Committee (Apr. 2, 1992) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Minutes]. See generally Tobias, supra note 102, at 1408.
231. See Tobias, supra note 102, at 1409-11.
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (pilot program).
233. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 102, at 1411-13.
234. See H.R. REP. No. 104-10 (1995); see also Cavanagh, supra note 116. See generally Carl
Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1995).

No. 2]

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET

585

posals' introduction and consideration substantially altered the terms
of debate, although the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA) 235 was the only constituent of the package that actually
became law. Indeed, the reforms at least deflected attention from the
CJRA and apparently had effects on that statute analogous to its impacts on the JIA, essentially suspending interest in, if not implementation of, the CJRA. Finally, the 1994 congressional elections left
Senator Biden, the CJRA's principal sponsor, as the ranking minority
member, rather than chair, of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This
meant that he could exercise less leadership to generate interest in
overseeing statutory effectuation. 236
iii.

Assessment Entities

Congress designated several bodies to assess the procedures
adopted under the CJRA and apparently intended that experimentation would receive rigorous analysis. 237 However, the entities selected
and difficulties involving statutory implementation may have compromised this goal's achievement. For example, delayed adoption of
CJRA measures in numerous pilot and demonstration districts complicated the RAND and Federal Judicial Center (FJC) efforts to study
those courts, while the FJC had relatively few resources for conducting its evaluation. 238 The districts and advisory groups to which
Congress assigned responsibility for compiling annual assessments
concomitantly had limited time, resources, and technical expertise for
performing these analyses. 239
b.
i.

More Specific Analysis of the CJRA's Guidance and Its
Effectuation
The Structure of Experimentation

Congress drafted the CJRA, and the districts implemented the
statute, in ways that undermined uniformity and simplicity as well as
enhanced judicial discretion, expense, and delay. A significant complication was the choice to have each of the ninety-four districts effectuate the Act, which meant that numerous districts were
experimenting simultaneously. This situation precluded some courts
235. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
236. Senator Biden is now the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, thus making Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) the ranking minority member of the Judiciary
Committee. See Lawrence J. Goodrich, Senate Committees Choose Chiefs, CHRISTIAN Sc1. MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1996, at 9.
237. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
238. See Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345;
Act of Oct. 3, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-33, 109 Stat. 292 (amending the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990). See generally Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, The Civil Justice Reform Act Amendment Act of 1995, 164 F.R.D. 577 (1996); Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, The Judicial
Amendments Act of 1994, 159 F.R.D. 649 (1995).
239. For more discussion of these entities, see infra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
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from capitalizing on previous efforts and reduced the opportunities
for productive interchange among the districts. 240
The legislation concomitantly instructed each court to examine,
and consider prescribing, eleven statutorily provided measures and
any others found appropriate, rather than restricting, for instance,
how many districts could experiment or the number of procedures
that courts might employ.241 The statute encouraged numerous districts to apply quite a few diverse mechanisms, 242 certain ones of
which increased complexity, phenomena that complicated and raised
the cost of litigation by, for example, demanding that lawyers and litigants prepare additional papers and participate in more activities. 243
ii.

Congressional Guidance in the CJRA's First Three Sections

Unclear guidance, conflicting prescriptions, and even internally
inconsistent concepts in the legislation's initial three sections undermined uniformity and simplicity, while increasing cost and delay. Section 471 provided the purposes of civil justice expense and delay
reduction plans, 244 section 472 instructed advisory groups how to formulate reports and recommendations, 245 and section 473 enumerated
principles, guidelines, and techniques that districts were to examine
and could have prescribed. 246
Particular aspects of section 472 show how the three provisions
had internal inconsistencies and conflicted with each other. The section commanded advisory groups to posit recommendations that
would "reduc[e] cost and delay and thereby facilitat[ e] access to the
courts." 247 Attempts to realize these two objectives might have conflicted, as the experience of litigants with few resources illustrates.
Procedures that expedite case resolution can actually disadvantage,
240. Congress required all districts to name advisory groups 90 days after passage. See 28
U.S.C. § 478(a) (1994). Thirty-four courts qualified for EIDC status by adopting plans by the
end of 1991, but most districts fully implemented plans in 1992, while numerous non-EIDCs
attempted to finish their plans in 1992. Many groups and districts were essentially working at the
same time, which limited opportunities to profit from prior experimentation and interdistrict
consultation.
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 473.
242. For instance, the Eastern Districts of Arkansas and Virginia published brief plans that
altered few local procedures. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE E. DIST. OF ARK., CIVIL JusncE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF VA.,
Civ1L JusTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991). The Eastern District of Texas
assembled a terse plan that included several innovative ideas, while the Massachusetts District
adopted a long plan with many complex procedures. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF
TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991) [hereinafter E. DIST. OF
TEXAS PLAN]; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN (1991).
243. See Tobias, supra note 102, at 1422-27; see also infra note 259 and accompanying text.
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 471.
245. See id. § 472.
246. See id. § 473.
247. Id. § 472(c)(3); see also Tobias, supra note 156, at 495-98 (affording ideas regarding
resource discrepancies among litigants in this paragraph and in remainder of article).
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and limit federal court access for, impecunious parties who frequently
need more time to conclude discovery and collect the requisite material to prove their cases. 248 Section 472, therefore, required advisory
groups to make suggestions that would have implemented the requirement of delay reduction but frustrated the equally critical mandate of
facilitating court access, which is in the provision's identical clause. 249
Essential to the issues examined in this article is the three sections' guidance, which encouraged the districts to adopt local measures that contravened the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and acts of
Congress. 250 Neither the language of the CJRA nor its legislative history apparently proscribed these inconsistencies. Section 473 provided that districts were to examine, and might prescribe, eleven
enumerated mechanisms, while numerous courts seemingly depended
on the statutory provisions to apply conflicting local requirements. 251
The CJRA's final prescription, which authorized courts to employ such additional measures as they considered appropriate after
consulting recommendations of their advisory groups, implicitly invited districts to adopt procedures that were inconsistent with the federal rules or statutes. 252 Numerous advisory groups suggested that
courts implement, and a number of districts prescribed, local procedures that conflicted with provisions of the rules or the United States
Code. The civil justice plan for the Eastern District of Texas most
aggressively proffered this authority by declaring that "[t]o the extent
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this
Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling. " 253 The district, in
an apparent effort to demonstrate that it could exercise this power,
implemented an offer of judgment requirement that contravened Rule
68. 254 The court concomitantly instituted a maximum fee schedule in
contingent fee cases that fee-shifting legislation does not govem, 255
although the Supreme Court has specifically proclaimed that litigation
248. See Tobias, supra note 156, at 495-98.
249. See supra text accompanying note 247. Section 472's delay reduction requirement
could conflict with section 471 's statement that one purpose of plans is to "ensure just ... resolutions of civil disputes." Compare 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3), with id. § 471.
250. The Rules Enabling Act states that local rules must be "consistent with Acts of Congress" and the federal rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a) (requiring local
rules to "be consistent with-but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress" and federal rules).
251. The most controversial illustrations implicated automatic disclosure, some of which
would have substantially changed traditional notions of discovery. See, e.g., IDAHO PLAN, supra
note 227, at pt. V; E. DIST. OF NEW YoRK PLAN, supra note 49, at pt. II.A.
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6). Congress may have considered this a narrower grant of
authority than did a number of judges. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy: Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929 (1996); Robel, supra note 2; see also CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 63A, at 438-39 (5th ed. 1994).
253. E. DIST. oF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 242, at art. VI(5).
254. Compare id. at art. VI(a), with FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
255. See E. DIST. OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 242, at art. V; see also Ashland Chem., Inc. v.
Barco, Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265-67 (5th Cir. 1997); Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 885
F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Carrington, supra note 252.
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expenses are to be allocated by the legislative, rather than the judicial,
branch. 256

iii.

Practical Implementation

(a)

The Procedures Adopted

Nearly all of the federal districts adopted varying combinations of
the eleven legislatively prescribed principles, guidelines, and techniques, while numerous courts applied a broad spectrum of mechanisms pursuant to the last open-textured provision. A number of the
measures that districts promulgated and enforced undermined uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and imposed additional
cost and delay. Indeed, the five-year RAND Corporation study of the
pilot districts concluded that the CJRA procedures had saved little
expense or time and had minimal effect on other important
parameters. 257
Many courts applied particular strictures that had these impacts.
For example, numerous districts' adoption of diverse permutations of
automatic disclosure eroded uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity while increasing cost and delay. 258 A number of courts invoked
judicial case management mechanisms, which expanded judicial discretion to demand that attorneys or parties file more papers and participate in additional conferences, thus imposing expense and delay. 259
CJRA provisions that empowered judicial officers to refer lawsuits to
ADR in numerous districts similarly enlarged judicial discretion to require the involvement of counsel and litigants in activities that increased cost and delay. 260 Some courts employed multiple tracks for
actions dependent on their case type or complexity, which enabled
districts to apply diverse measures to different suits, thereby expanding judicial discretion and reducing uniformity and
transsubstantivity. 261
256. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990); see also
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). Additional courts prescribed measures which
are or seem inconsistent, but most were less explicit. See, e.g., supra note 52 (noting Montana
District's experimentation with coequal assignment of civil cases to Article III judges and magistrate judges). For elaboration of how the principles, guidelines, and techniques undermined uniformity and simplicity and for additional examples, see Tobias, supra note 102, at 1418-22.
257. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 1-2; JuDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997).
258. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text.
259. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l)-(3), (a)(5), (b)(l)-(3), (b)(5) (1994). See generally RAND
JCM STUDY, supra note 119.
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6), (b)(4).
261. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE S. DIST. OF FLA., CIVIL JusTicE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 102-06 (1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION DIST., CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN pt. B.1 (1991);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l)-(3). See generally RAND JCM STUDY, supra note 119, at 47-50.
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In short, many mechanisms that districts adopted under the
CJRA imposed expense and delay, a phenomenon that was exactly
the opposite of the express statutory purpose. A number of additional
measures were apparently neutral in the sense that they saved minimal cost or time. Illustrative is the practice of setting early, firm trial
dates under the second statutorily prescribed procedure in courts with
substantial criminal dockets. 262 Although early, firm settings may
generally expedite litigation, they can be meaningless in this context
because the Speedy Trial Act accords criminal cases an automatic
preference leading to an "inefficient 'hurry up and wait' atmosphere. "263 Some efforts to employ differentiated case management
similarly afforded little benefit because judges apparently prefer to resolve specific lawsuits in ways that they deem appropriate rather than
fit them into predetermined classifications. 264 Even the techniques
that attained the CJRA's objective of decreasing expense or delay
may have sacrificed uniformity, simplicity, or transsubstantivity or significant process values, namely, justice or open court access, or had
other adverse side effects. 265 It is also important to remember that
certain of the procedures that proved most efficacious were not actually new. 266
(b)

Procedural Interpretation and Application

Numerous judges inconsistently construed or applied a number of
the local requirements instituted pursuant to civil justice reform, while
a few judges failed to enforce some measures prescribed in the civil
justice plans that their districts adopted. 267 Many attorneys and parties experienced problems locating the relevant local strictures,268 a
phenomenon that automatic disclosure's implementation exemplifies.
A few courts simply took no action respecting disclosure that they
reduced to written form, thereby leaving treatment to local practice or
understandings. 269 Additional districts eschewed the procedure's in262.
263.
264.

I rely in this sentence and the next on Cavanagh, supra note 116.
Cavanagh, supra note 116.
See id.; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text. See generally RAND JCM
STUDY, supra note 119, at 47-50.
265. For example, measures that facilitate dispute resolution or require participation in
ADR can detrimentally affect impecunious parties who require greater time for discovery and
for assembling their cases and who may lack resources to participate in ADR.
266. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
267. These ideas are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with civil
justice reform in many districts. Clear examples are the Southern District of Indiana and the
District of Massachusetts. See also Carl Tobias, Recent Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana,
55 MoNT. L. REv. 235, 239 (1994) (finding interdivisional disuniformity).
268. I rely substantially here on my review of nationwide developments in civil justice reform, derived from evaluating advisory group reports and recommendations and districts' plans
and from conversations with many individuals knowledgeable about civil justice reform. See also
supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (discussing automatic disclosure).
269. See Carl Tobias, Improving the I988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1589, 1621 & n.207 (1994).
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clusion in their civil justice plans and only published general, standing,
or special orders, or sent letters to members of the local federal bar,
little of which information was readily accessible, or conveyed, to attorneys who practice beyond the confines of the courts. 270
c.

Evaluation of CJRA Implementation

Congress seemingly contemplated that experimentation under
the CJRA would receive comparatively rigorous analysis; however,
complications involving statutory effectuation seemed to frustrate that
objective's achievement. For instance, evaluators apparently encountered difficulty in comparing and contrasting various measures' effectiveness across districts because too many courts were experimenting
at the same time. A number of districts were unable to assemble the
annual assessments specifically mandated by the CJRA. 271 Some
EIDCs concluded their analyses over a year after prescribing plans, a
phenomenon that partly resulted from the failure to establish baselines for calculating expense and delay reduction. 272 A few courts
compiled brief evaluations that lacked empirical material and additional analytical information,273 while a number of districts did not
issue these assessments annually. 274
The RAND Corporation, which the Judicial Conference selected
to evaluate the pilot program, and the FJC, which the Conference
chose to analyze the demonstration program, experienced difficulties
concluding their studies. 275 In fairness, some pilot districts and demonstration courts delayed implementation of experimentation that
correspondingly postponed RAND and FJC assessment efforts. 276
Congress responded to these circumstances by twice delaying the date
on which the Conference was to tender its suggestions to Congress. 277
Notwithstanding the dearth of reliable empirical information, certain patterns can be identified. Numerous features of the CJRA and
270. See, e.g., Order of John H. Moore II, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida (Nov. 9, 1993); Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court
for the District of Montana, to Members of the Federal Bar of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Montana (Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). But see
D. MoNT. R. 200-5(a).
271. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1994).
272. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23; Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil
Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 124 (1993).
273. See, e.g., Minutes of the Local Rules Committee (Feb. 1, 1993) (Wyoming) (on file with
the author).
274. Numerous courts may have issued no written annual assessments, and a few apparently
published only one. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 23; WESTLAW, CJRA
Database; Cavanagh, supra note 116.
275. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Carl Tobias, Extending the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 105 (1995). See also RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123.
276. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
277. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 608, 110 Stat.
3847, 3860; Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345.
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statutory effectuation, especially the measures actually prescribed in,
and applied under, the legislation, eroded the precepts of uniformity,
simplicity, and transsubstantivity and enhanced expense and delay.
The experimentation examined above essentially postponed those aspects of the JIA that Congress meant to treat the problems that resulted from proliferating local procedures.
2.

Beneficial Aspects
a. Relevant Entities
i. Implementing Entities

Some districts did bring together diverse participants in civil litigation, who formulated creative cost and delay reduction measures
that were responsive to all interests that are involved in federal lawsuits. These courts assembled advisory groups whose composition was
balanced, for instance, in terms of plaintiffs and defense counsel. 278 A
number of groups made suggestions that were as solicitous of national
uniformity and simplicity as of local judges, lawyers, and litigants,
while a few groups developed innovative recommendations for decreasing expense or delay. For example, courts in a few states that
encompass multiple districts insured intrastate uniformity by adopting
identical CJRA procedures. 279
ii.

Monitoring Entities

Some monitoring entities rather rigorously discharged their oversight responsibilities. For example, the Ninth Circuit Review Committee closely evaluated, and recommended numerous modifications in,
procedures, particularly inconsistent measures, prescribed by the
EIDCs within the committee's purview. 280 Moreover, a few districts
responded to these suggestions by changing their requirements. 281
Statutory assignment of relatively unclear, limited duties to the Judicial Conference and that entity's apparent deference to Congress
probably explain less stringent Conference review. 282 However, the
Administrative Office and the FJC, the two primary research arms of
the federal courts, carefully tracked CJRA implementation and pro278. See, e.g., MONTANA REPORT, supra note 226, at frontispiece; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at frontispiece (1991), reprinted in
138 F.R.D. 167 (1991).
279. See, e.g., Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the N. & S. Districts of Iowa; Local
Rules, U.S. District Courts for the E. & W. Districts of Kentucky; Local Rules, U.S. District
Courts for the E., M., & W. Districts of Louisiana.
280. See Minutes, supra note 230. But see supra note 229 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., U.S. D1sT. CouRT FOR THE D1sT. OF ALASKA, CIVIL JusTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 7 (1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ., CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION (discovery motions) (1993). But see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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duced several valuable studies of statutory effectuation. 283 Comparatively lenient congressional oversight can probably be ascribed
principally to the broad spectrum of other significant responsibilities
that senators and representatives have and to the introduction and
consideration of the legal reforms in the Contract with America.
iii.

Assessment Entities

Congress did provide for some expert entities to evaluate experimentation under the CJRA. For instance, the Judicial Conference selected the RAND Corporation and the FJC to study the pilot and
demonstration districts, and both instrumentalities produced comprehensive, refined reports. 284 Even Congress's decision to assign districts and advisory groups responsibility for conducting annual
assessments relied upon entities that had substantial familiarity with
the measures and the courts being evaluated. 285
b.

More Specific Analysis of the CJRA's Guidance and Its
Effectuation

i.

The Structure of Experimentation

Congress did structure the statute in some ways that it intended
to reduce or ameliorate inconsistency, complications, cost, and delay,
or to promote important phenomena, such as bench-bar interchange
and experimentation with innovative strictures. For instance, the
CJRA prescribed eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques that
Congress contemplated many courts would adopt while including a
twelfth open-ended prescription that promoted experimentation with
creative techniques. 286 The statute provided for pilot districts and
demonstration courts that applied analogous measures, thereby promoting uniformity, and for EIDCs which were to experiment before
the other districts, so that courts experimenting subsequently might
benefit from the EIDCs' experience. 287 The legislation initiated the
most intensive self-evaluation by the district courts in their history.
The conceptualization of reform proceeding from the bottom up fostered valuable exchange within and among the ninety-four federal districts and with the state courts.
283. See, e.g., JumcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MoDEL PLAN FOR REDUCTION OF Ex.
PENSE AND DELAY IN CIVIL CASES (1992); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121,
reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997).
284. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123.
285. For more discussion of these entities, see infra notes 304-20 and accompanying text.
286. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1994).
287. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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Practical Implementation
The Procedures Adopted

A number of the federal district courts prescribed comparatively
similar combinations of the eleven statutorily delineated principles,
guidelines, and techniques, while some courts even applied rather
analogous mechanisms under the final open-ended proviso. Numerous procedures that the districts promulgated and employed were relatively uniform, simple, and transsubstantive, and certain measures
saved expense or time.
Many courts adopted or applied particular requirements that had
these effects. At a general level, a number of districts that were not
EIDCs apparently modeled their civil justice plans on those that the
EIDCs had already issued while prescribing few strictures that the
EIDCs had not employed. More specifically, the CJRA commanded
the ten pilot courts to experiment with the six identical principles and
guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction
identified in section 473(a). 288
Numerous districts implemented some techniques, especially in
the general fields of judicial case management, differentiated case
management, discovery, and ADR, that directly treated expense and
delay and seemed to be reasonably successful, even though the
RAND study of pilot courts found minimal cost or delay reduction. 289
For example, RAND concluded that effective judicial case management saved time and perhaps money, thus confirming the conventional wisdom that has developed over two decades of reliance on
these mechanisms. 290 The District of Montana employed an opt-out
procedure for securing consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction in civil
cases that expedited dispute resolution. 291 Several districts' use of differentiated case management seemed to limit expense and delay
somewhat. 292
The District of Maine and the Eastern District of New York relied on judicial officers to treat discovery controversies promptly
through telephone conference calls, thus saving the time and cost entailed in preparing papers, participating in oral arguments, and resolv288. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
289. See RAND ExECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 22; RAND ADR STUDY, supra
note 122, at 23-25.
290. See RAND JCM STUDY, supra note 119, at 52-54; see also supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
291. See 1994 ANN. ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE & DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN OF THE U.S. DISTRICT CouRT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MoNT. 4; see also Carl Tobias, ReEvaluating Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 307, 312-13 (1995); Tobias, supra note 52.
292. See, e.g., 1995 DIFFERENTIATED CASE MGMT. IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
W. DISTRICT OF MICH., ANN. ASSESSMENT; 1993 U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THEN. DISTRICT OF
OHIO, ANN. AssESSMENT OF Civ. & CRIM. DocKET, available in 1993 WL 319599, at 1-3 (hereinafter N. D1sT. OF OHIO AssESSMENT). See generally FJC STUDY, supra note 123, at 7-15, 29-132.
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ing disputes. 293 Some observers attribute the mounting number of
settlements in civil suits in the District of Massachusetts to automatic
disclosure, 294 although experimentation with disclosure in the twenty
courts that RAND studied and in some other districts has yielded inconclusive judgments regarding the technique's efficacy and whether
it imposes expense or delay. 295
Certain ADR techniques seem to have enjoyed considerable success. For instance, court-annexed arbitration has proved sufficiently
effective that Congress authorized continued experimentation in numerous districts while the first session of the 105th Congress empowered all ninety-four courts to use court-annexed arbitration. 296 The
Early Assessment Program employed in the Western District of Missouri has significantly increased the percentage of cases that settle in
that court. 297
Many districts have applied a miscellany of procedures that have
decreased expense or delay. For example, the District of Maryland
has sharply limited disputes over attorney's fees by requiring that
counsel who anticipate requesting fees submit monthly reports to the
court. 298 The Northern District of Illinois has employed status conferences every six months in civil lawsuits to explore the pace of litigation, especially discovery, and this technique has expedited case
resolution. 299 The district has also encouraged its judges to volunteer
in assisting other members of the court to treat litigation on their
dockets, and awards the volunteers credit. 300 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, which enjoys a reputation as a cohesive court, has relied
293. See Telephone Interview with D. Brock Hornby, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for
the District of Maine (Jan. 29, 1997); Counsel Connect Debates; Civil Justice Reform; Five Years
Later, TEX. LAW., Feb. 24, 1997, at 28 (discussing Eastern District of New York). See generally
FJC STUDY, supra note 123, at 10-11.
294. See Telephone Interview with Dan Coquillette, Professor, Boston College Law School
(Jan. 27, 1997); see also D. MASS. R. 26.2.
295. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121, at 17; FJC STUDY supra note 123, at
12; Cavanagh, supra note 116; supra note 217 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 74; see also Act of Oct. 8, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 1, 111Stat.1173
(authorizing all courts to use court-annexed arbitration). See generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER
& DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT JN THE FEDERAL DISTRICf COURTS (Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1996).
297. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kent Snapp & Deborah Bell to Judges in the Western
District of Missouri (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with the author); see also FJC STUDY, supra note
123, at 173-282 (describing the ADR and Multi-Option Programs in the Northern District of
California and discussing the impact of the ADR programs); RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note
108, at 71-76; RAND ADR STUDY, supra note 122, at 23-25. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil
Justice Reform in the Western District of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335 (1993).
298. See Telephone Interview with Fred Russillo, CJRA Specialist, Administrative Office of
U.S. Courts (Jan. 27, 1997); see also U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE DIST. OF Mo., REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES IN PRO BONO CASES (1997).
299. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE N.D. OF ILL, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN (1993).
300. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Fred Russillo, supra note 298.
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upon similar measures that enable it to function as a court qua
court. 301
In short, this survey of techniques that districts promulgated and
applied under the CJRA suggests that numerous, diverse procedures
have decreased expense and delay. The review also indicates that the
courts have creatively developed and applied a number of efficacious
mechanisms. In the final analysis, all ninety-four districts have maintained a measure of uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and
most courts have not invoked procedures that imposed cost or delay.
Experimentation thus shows that the statute was not a radical reform
and that districts cautiously implemented the legislation.
(b)

Procedural Interpretation and Application

The vast majority of district judges did, or attempted to, interpret
and apply consistently local procedures adopted under the CJRA,
while a very small number of judges refused to implement the requirements imposed in their courts' plans. Certain difficulties that accompanied the legislation's effectuation could have been ascribed more to
judicial construction and implementation than to the statute as
drafted. The quintessential illustration is the twelfth procedural provision that Congress apparently intended to be a considerably narrower
grant of power than some federal judges treated it. 302
Numerous courts instituted certain measures to facilitate the
CJRA's effectuation. The districts encouraged thorough, ongoing, and
open bench-bar communication about the procedures considered,
adopted, and applied, while a number of courts went to extraordinary
lengths in notifying lawyers and litigants of the new techniques with
which districts were experimenting. For example, some courts widely
circulated proposed procedures and broadly disseminated information
on the mechanisms actually implemented, and practically all districts
reduced the measures to written form. 303
(c)

Ancillary Benefits of Experimentation

Experimentation in the ninety-four federal districts afforded
many ancillary advantages. For instance, development of the advisory
groups' reports and the civil justice plans, application of the cost and
delay reduction procedures, and compilation of the annual assessments of those measures and their refinement promoted valuable in301. See U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THEE. DIST. OF PA., CIVIL JusncE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDucnoN PLAN (1991), available in 1991 WL 525098.
302. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
303. The Northern District of Illinois and the M<:mtana District widely circulated proposals
and information on procedures actually applied. Indeed, two national services have reproduced
most of the CJRA procedures in multivolume treatises, although one was first published in 1996.
See DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL COURT GUIDELINES (1997); FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES (2d
ed. 1995).
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terchange involving judges, lawyers, litigants, and court personnel.
Experimentation concomitantly encouraged the judges of numerous
courts to view, or reconsider and emphasize, their districts as courts
qua courts and to institute cooperative, districtwide mechanisms for
limiting expense and delay. The national effort similarly fostered constructive exchange among judges, attorneys, parties, and court staff
across many districts.
c.

Evaluation of CJRA Implementation

Congress provided for the thoroughgoing assessment of the experimentation that proceeded in the districts. It commissioned an unprecedented, searching analysis by the RAND Corporation of the
pilot courts, while Congress asked that the Judicial Conference comprehensively evaluate the demonstration districts and submit to Congress reports on the pilot and demonstration court experimentation
and a recommendation on whether the pilot project warranted expansion.304 Congress mandated that all ninety-four districts compile annual assessments and refine the measures employed in light of those
studies. 305
RAND recently concluded its examination of the pilot courts,
which is probably the most intensive analysis of federal districts' application of techniques intended to reduce cost and delay ever undertaken.306 RAND meticulously collected, evaluated, and synthesized
an enormous amount of valuable empirical information on those procedures, the federal courts' operation, and participants in civil litigation. Some of these raw data will probably warrant greater scrutiny,
which may well yield many instructive insights, because Congress and
the Judicial Conference assigned RAND the relatively circumscribed
charge of assessing comparatively few specific devices in a rather
small number of districts. 307
The FJC also recently completed its analysis of the demonstration
courts, which similarly affords helpful perspectives on the efficacy of
the mechanisms that these districts applied and considerable additional material on the federal courts' functioning and those involved
in civil litigation. 308 The FJC effort is not as informative as the RAND
endeavor principally because the Center had a narrower mandate, was
studying five districts, had limited resources to perform its evaluation,
and assembled, reviewed, and synthesized significantly less data. 309
304. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994); see also RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123; JumCIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in
175 F.R.D. 62, 73 (1997). The FJC actually performed the evaluation of the demonstration districts. See FJC STUDY, supra.
305. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1994).
306. See RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 121 & 123.
308. See FJC STUDY, supra note 123.
309: See id.
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However, the comprehensive, detailed nature of the report 'compiled,
as well as the apparent success that several demonstration courts attained in reducing expense or delay, means that the FJC endeavor
should advance the inquiry in important ways. 310
The Judicial Conference submitted its report and recommendation on the pilot court experimentation to Congress in May 1997. 311
The Conference determined that the districts had applied most of the
CJRA principles, guidelines, and techniques; however, the Conference did "not support expansion of the Act's case management principles and guidelines to other courts as a total package." 312 The
Conference based its recommendation primarily on the RAND analysis which ascertained that considerations other than judicial case management measures drive litigation expenses and that the pilot court
experimentation per se did not appear to decrease significantly cost or
delay because the districts were already applying most of the statutorily prescribed procedures. 313 The Conference noted the RAND Corporation's conclusion that six mechanisms proposed by the CJRA are
efficacious, when used together, in reducing delay without increasing
expense: "(1) early judicial case management; (2) early setting of the
trial schedule; (3) shortening discovery cutoff; (4) periodic public reporting of the status of each judge's docket; (5) conducting scheduling
and discovery conferences by telephone; and (6) implementing the advisory group process. " 314 The Judicial Conference report, therefore,
provided suggested alternatives to expansion of the pilot program,
which it premised essentially on statutory experimentation as well as
findings, commentary, and suggestions relating to particular measures
for effective case management. 315 The alternative procedures and recommendations constituted the Conference's alternative expense and
delay reduction program as required by the CJRA. 316
Numerous specific districts concluded their annual assessments in
a timely manner, and some courts produced the evaluations during
each year following the one in which they adopted CJRA plans. 317
Many districts conducted carefully structured, full or instructive analyses, 318 while certain courts improved strictures that they applied in ac310. See supra notes 292, 297, and accompanying text.
311. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997).
312. Id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997).
313. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 80 (1997).
314. Id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997); see also id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 80-81
(1997).
315. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 74 (1997).
316. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1997).
317. See WEsTLAW, CJRA Database; see also RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 2359. The District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are illustrative.
318. See, e.g., 1993 U.S. DISTRICT CouRT FOR THE N. DISTRICT OF GA., ANN. AssESSMENT
OF THE CONDITION OF THE COURT'S DOCKET, available in 1993 WL 524466; N. D1sT. OF OHio
AssESSMENT, supra note 292, available in 1993 WL 319599, at 1-3.
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cord with information gleaned from the assessments. 319 The Northern
District of Ohio has even undertaken an ambitious effort to estimate
costs and scrutinize effective ways of decreasing expenses,320 phenomena which have proved much more elusive than those relating to delay
and its reduction.

3.

Major Lessons

The seven-year, unprecedented national experiment with procedures that senators and representatives intended to limit cost and delay in civil litigation affords a number of helpful lessons that involve
Congress, the federal courts, districts, judges, court personnel, attorneys, and parties. The ideas have significant implications for them
and should be especially useful to individuals and institutions, such as
members of the Senate, the House, and the federal bench, as well as
the Judicial Conference, that develop public policy for the district
courts and that plan future reform efforts.
a.

The Modest Nature of the Reform

The CJRA experience teaches that Congress instituted a relatively modest reform that most federal districts cautiously implemented and that yielded unremarkable results. These determinations
are not surprising and might well have been anticipated, particularly
given the statute's objectives, sources, and structure; the interests and
perspectives of those assigned primary responsibility for effectuating
the legislation and for monitoring that implementation; and procedural reforms' intrinsic limitations, including the glacial pace at which
they advance and the resistance of expense and delay to procedural
amelioration. 321
The findings of the RAND Corporation and the Judicial Conference that pilot court application of the six CJRA principles and guidelines provided little benefit in terms of important outcomes but that
judicial case management can save time may seem inconclusive, while
these determinations and the Conference's recommendation against
expansion of the CJRA's case management principles and guidelines
as a total package might be disappointing. Nonetheless, it is valuable
to have systematically collected, analyzed, and synthesized empirical
319. See, e.g., 1992 U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRI= OF N.J., ANN. ASSESSMENT OF
THE Civ. JusT. EXPENSE & DELAY REou=ION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE Civ. JusT.
REFORM Acr oF 1990 IN THE D1sTR1= OF N.J. 20; General Order No. 92-93 Amending Article
Four, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas (Oct. 29, 1992).
320. See Telephone Interview with Geri M. Smith, Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Feb. 24, 1997).
321. "[J]udicial reform is no sport for the short-winded." MrNIMUM STANDARDS OF JumCIAL ADMrNISTRATION xix (Arthur Vanderbilt ed., 1949); see also Burbank, supra note 68, at
1928.
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data that apparently confirm the conventional wisdom regarding procedure's inherent restrictions and respecting case management.
Congress had substantial responsibility for the modest character
of civil justice reform. First, the CJRA's express purpose was decreasing cost and delay in civil litigation through the application of procedures. However, it was uncertain that expense or delay was
sufficiently troubling to warrant treatment or that procedural change
was the best solution, and even were these circumstances clearer,
which measures would be most efficacious. 322 A large percentage of
the techniques that Congress prescribed and that courts applied had
already received experimentation in numerous districts and many
states, much of which testing suggested procedural reforms' intrinsic
constraints. 323 Those endeavors indicated, and the CJRA effort seemingly reaffirms, that the federal and state courts have attained practically all of the cost and delay reduction possible with procedures.
Indeed, nonprocedural approaches-such as supplementing the federal judiciary's resources, modifying court structure or administration,
or altering the current American adversarial system-may more effectively secure additional, meaningful monetary and temporal
economies.
Senators and representatives concomitantly ignored or underestimated several phenomena that contribute to, or might decrease, expense and delay in civil litigation while minimally treating them in the
CJRA. For example, some advisory groups, districts, and judges observed that criminal cases are significant sources of cost and delay, a
factor that the 1990 statute essentially disregarded, 324 and others
stated that the more expeditious filling of judicial vacancies could conserve resources and time. 325
Congress also entrusted most day-to-day CJRA effectuation and
oversight to individuals and entities, while structuring and funding the
CJRA in ways that may have limited the statute's efficacy, particularly
its ambitious implementation. For instance, federal judges, many of
whom believed that the legislation was an unwarranted, and even unconstitutional, attempt to micromanage the courts, had virtually exclusive responsibility for effectuating and monitoring the CJRA.
322. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 80
(1997).
323. See id., reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 67, 80 (1997).
324. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADv1soRY GROUP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouRT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK pt. II (1991); ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.
CouRT FOR THE MIDDLE D1s-r. OF N.C., supra note 131, at 57-58; RAND PILOT STUDY, supra
note 108, at 21-22. But cf 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(l) (1994) (requiring analysis of criminal dockets).
325. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA pt. IIJ(C)(2)(a)
(1991); REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY
GROUP FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS pt. II(B)(l-2) (1991); see also infra notes 409-17 and
accompanying text (more phenomena). See generally Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a
Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998).
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Moreover, senators and representatives might have complicated efficacious implementation and oversight by facilitating simultaneous experimentation in a large number of districts and by seeming to ignore
or deemphasize integral features of the federal justice system. These
include the individual calendaring scheme that the courts employ, the
independence of Article III judges, and the deference that numerous
members of the bench accord district judges when operating, and
choosing procedures for, their courts. Congress correspondingly appropriated rather few resources to effectuate the CJRA and to monitor implementation. 326
It should not have been surprising that considerable statutory
compliance was honored in the breach. For example, districts varied
significantly in terms of the rigor with which they analyzed dockets,
promulgated and applied CJRA measures, evaluated those mechanisms' effectiveness, and prepared annual assessments, while most circuit review committees undertook minimal oversight of the strictures
that district courts prescribed and enforced. 327
Finally, even if procedures were more efficacious in reducing expense or delay and all districts and judges were to adopt identical requirements, a major impediment would remain. Certain phenomena,
such as the federal courts' structure, disparate local conditions, the
perceived need to address dissimilar cases differently, and individual
judges' abilities, predilections, and viewpoints, would seriously frustrate uniform procedural administration and application.
b.

Ironies

CJRA experimentation was replete with ironies, some of which
already have been mentioned. One illustration is how the experience
apparently sensitized many participants in federal civil litigation to
several developments. Perhaps most importantly, the increased balkanization of procedure that testing wrought has seemingly galvanized
much of the bar and numerous judges to explore and institute means
of decreasing fragmentation, particularly by limiting the proliferation
of inconsistent local measures. 328 For instance, a number of districts
have comprehensively evaluated local requirements in an attempt to
make them simpler and more uniform or have actually abrogated or
modified strictures, principally conflicting ones. 329 Indeed, CJRA experimentation that suspended effectuation of the JIA mandates that
326. See Cavanagh, supra note 116.
327. See supra notes 227, 267-74, and accompanying text (analyzing districts); supra notes
228-29 and accompanying text (analyzing circuit committees); see also supra notes 41-43, 53-54,
83-87, 132-41, and accompanying text (suggesting compliance resembles most circuit councils'
and districts' discharge of duties to limit local proliferation imposed in JIA and Rule 83).
328. I rely in this sentence and the remainder of this paragraph on Cavanagh, supra note
116; see also supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text; infra note 405 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 132, 134-35, 318-19, and accompanying text.
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Congress intended to reduce local procedural proliferation has rekindled interest in treating the very problem that the JIA was meant to
address. The balkanization created concomitantly imposed additional
expense and delay, a result precisely the opposite of the legislation's
expressly stated goal.
A few ironies involved the CJRA mechanisms that proved to be
most efficacious. For example, RAND and the FJC, as well as many
judges, attorneys, and litigants, found that the statutorily prescribed
procedures employed in pilot and demonstration districts were comparatively ineffective, even though Congress and the courts spent millions of dollars testing and assessing those measures. 330 More specific
illustrations are various forms of ADR which were costly and automatic disclosure that apparently operated best in narrow, discrete contexts.331 In contrast, judicial case management, which judges have
practiced for two decades, saved time and perhaps expense, while certain other techniques that districts had used earlier worked well. 332
Some quite successful procedures also were ones that courts and
judges invented, a phenomenon that could attest to congressional wisdom in encouraging experimentation from the bottom up and capitalizing on local ingenuity. 333
Perhaps the consummate irony was the apparent inability of Congress to sustain interest in the reform until its completion. Indeed, the
first session of the 105th Congress recessed in November 1997 without
definitively resolving the fate of the CJRA, which was ostensibly
scheduled to expire on December 1, 1997. 334 Congressional failure to
provide conclusively for statutory expiration leaves unclear whether
the CJRA actually expired last December partly because the relevant
legislative history is sparse and ambiguous. 335 This lack of clarity
means that many districts have continued to apply procedures that
they prescribed under the CJRA, although such measures that conflict
330. See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 213-17, 258, 260, and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 289-90, 296, and accompanying text; see also supra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 291, 293, 297-301, and accompanying text.
334. The statute provides that the "requirements set forth in sections 471 through 478 of title
28, United States Code [(the CJRA)] ... shall remain in effect for seven years after" the December 1, 1990, date of enactment. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101650, § 103(b)(2), 104 Stat. 5096. But see Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat.
1173.
335. Subsection (b)(2) subjects sections 471 through 478 of the Civil Justice Reform Act
to a seven-year sunset provision so that those sections can be thoroughly tested. Upon the
expiration of the seven-year period following enactment, federal district courts are no
longer required to operate pursuant to the civil justice expense and delay reduction plans
mandated by Title I. Congress and the courts then will have a chance to evaluate those
provisions and, if warranted, reauthorize them.
S. REP. No. 101-416, at 63-64 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852-53.
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with the federal rules or United States Code provisions would be invalid if the statute did expire. 336
c.

Local Legal Culture and Civil Justice Reform

The idea of local legal culture yields instructive insights on CJRA
experimentation, even as the seven-year experience enhances understanding of the local legal culture concept. This notion means that
norms relating to phenomena, such as judges' productivity, discovery's
pace, and lawyers' civility, can differ significantly across districts, may
be responsible for the varied expense and time that are needed to
resolve civil disputes and could respond to distinctive local
procedures. 337
Several aspects of CJRA testing suggest that the analytical construct of local legal culture, which researchers had employed primarily
in the criminal law context, applies more felicitously than was formerly thought to civil litigation. 338 For instance, the experience with
judicial case management generally shows that the disparate conditions in particular courts affect cost and delay in civil lawsuits, that
these disputes are responsive to diverse case management, and that
nationwide deployment of identical measures can be impractical.
CJRA experimentation more specifically revealed numerous,
rather informative geographical patterns. Illustrative are certain districts situated in urban areas that encouraged their courts' judges to
cooperate and the districts to function as courts qua courts when expediting the disposition of substantial caseloads. 339 Other metropolitan
districts were among the initial courts that treated the proliferation of
conflicting local strictures or aggressively resisted abusive behavior of
attorneys and parties during lawsuits. 340 By comparison, a number of
districts that are in sparsely populated locales have exhibited less concern about, and adopted fewer mechanisms to address, delay, litigation and discovery abuse, and incivility. 341 It also seems that some
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994); FED. R. Crv. P. 83. One minor exception to the ideas
regarding inconsistent measures prescribed under the CJRA is the provision in certain 1993
federal civil rules amendments, principally governing discovery, that authorizes the courts to
promulgate and implement procedures that vary from the federal rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(l).
337. See Robel, supra note 2, at 1483-84; see also RAND JCM STUDY, supra note 119, at 3637; Carrington, supra note 252, at 945-47. See generally THOMAS W. CHURCH ET AL., JusTICE
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LmGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978).
338. Some researchers have persuasively questioned the concept's applicability to civil litigation. See Herbert Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of
Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'y REv. 535 (1993).
339. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
340. The Eastern and Southern Districts of New York treated proliferation by adopting
identical local civil rules. The Southern and the Northern Districts of California and Illinois
accounted for one-third of the early Rule 11 decisions under the 1983 revision of Rule 11, and I
assume that aggressive resistance to abusive behavior has continued in those courts. See
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1987).
341. Illustrative are the Districts of North and South Dakota.

No. 2]

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET

603

courts, whose Article III judges and magistrate judges are viewed similarly by attorneys and parties for purposes of civil dispute resolution,
serve cultures that enjoy reputations for egalitarianism. 342 In short,
these examples suggest that the local legal culture idea applies more
usefully to civil litigation than was earlier believed, that districts' varying norms can contribute to differences in the cost and time required
for concluding civil cases, and that disparate local circumstances respond to diverse measures.
d.

The Unclear Nature of Procedural Reform: Reconciling
the CJRA and the JIA

The analysis above indicates that the JIA and the CJRA, as
drafted and as effectuated, cannot be comprehensively harmonized
and may well conflict in several critical ways. When Congress passed
the JIA, it correctly understood that proliferating local requirements
were substantially undermining federal civil procedure's uniform, simple, and transsubstantive nature, enlarging judicial discretion, and imposing expense and delay in civil litigation. Congress provided for
entities and accorded them responsibilities that would address
proliferation's complications, namely, the increasing inconsistency between local strictures and the federal rules and statutes, while it systematized and opened to public scrutiny and involvement local
procedural revision processes. 343
Senators and representatives seemed to perceive that restoring
and maintaining the primacy of the national rule amendment process
might correspondingly treat proliferation and slow erosion of the fundamental procedural precepts. Statutory prescription for opening federal rule revision to greater public participation and input was meant
to enhance the quality of amendments proposed, even though that
legislative provision probably exposed this process to increased
politicization. 344 Congress, accordingly, reconfirmed and attempted to
revitalize several basic procedural concepts, namely, uniformity and
simplicity, that underlay the 1938 federal rules, and comprehensive
implementation of the JIA might have achieved these purposes. Effectuation of the CJRA, however, essentially supplanted the JIA's aspects that were intended to limit local procedural proliferation, while
certain 1993 federal rule revisions accommodated the 1990 legislation.
When Congress passed the CJRA, it emphasized different features of civil justice. Senators and representatives identified cost and
delay as important problems in considerable civil litigation and apparently believed that the uniform, simple, transsubstantive system of the
342. Illustrative are the Districts of Montana and Oregon. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 74-79, 154-71, 184-201, and accompanying text.

604

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1998

federal rules was substantially responsible for these complications. 345
Congress's changed conceptualization of the foremost difficulties confronting modern dispute resolution prompted its employment of new
techniques to combat them. In contrast with the JIA's purpose of reducing local proliferation, the CJRA facilitated district court experimentation involving potentially inconsistent local procedures that
were meant to address expense and delay. 346 Congress also prescribed institutions and assigned them responsibilities that it intended
would promote healthy dialogue among judges, attorneys, and parties,
across the districts, and between the federal and state courts, thereby
fostering reform from the bottom up, and discovery of, and consensus
about, cost and delay reduction measures. The CJRA, thus, stressed
the procedural precepts implicating prompt, economical dispute disposition, as opposed to uniformity, simplicity, transsubstantivity, and
significant process values. The practice of managerial judging and the
1983 federal rules changes best exemplify the themes that Congress
emphasized in 1990.
Several dimensions of CJRA effectuation suggest that senators
and representatives did not fully conceptualize the legislation's goals
and its practical implementation, particularly vis-a-vis the 1988 Act.
Most compelling was the 1990 statute's implicit invitation for courts to
prescribe local measures that contravened the federal rules or acts of
Congress. 347 That provision probably encouraged numerous districts
to adopt conflicting requirements and dissuaded circuit judicial councils from scrutinizing, much less abolishing, inconsistent local strictures. The above phenomena, especially the further erosion of a
national, uniform code of procedure, witnessed so soon after the JIA's
enactment, were ironic because the proliferation of conflicting local
requirements was a crucial problem that this legislation specifically
attempted to rectify. These particular statutory tensions are not isolated but could epitomize broader inconsistencies. For instance, the
JIA's purpose of reviving and increasing uniformity, simplicity, and
transsubstantivity clashed with the 1990 Act's objective of implementing local measures that would decrease cost and delay, factors that
could be attributed to the uniform, simple, transsubstantive system
that the original federal rules instituted. 348
The CJRA's goals, structure, and timing, and the 1993 federal
rules revisions authorizing local option, alone and together, essentially
frustrated attainment of the JIA's purposes and suspended attempts
to address local proliferation, which had eroded uniformity, simplicity,
345. See supra notes 90-94, 105, and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 107, 112, 252-56, and accompanying text.
347. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (1994); see also supra note 346 and accompanying text.
348. Judges also must have the requisite flexibility to apply local strictures that permit the
expeditious, economical, and just resolution of cases on local dockets. See Robert E. Keeton,
The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853 (1989).

No. 2]

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET

605

and transsubstantivity and increased judicial discretion, cost, and delay. The state of federal civil procedure, therefore, is worse than the
condition that Congress considered unacceptable in 1988. The
problems entailed in implementing the 1990 statute and the 1993 federal rule amendments examined already have exacerbated the procedural circumstances. In fact, the precepts of uniformity, simplicity,
and transsubstantivity that supported the 1938 federal rules are more
significantly eroded, while judicial discretion, expense, and delay
could be larger than at any time since the rules' adoption. Judges,
lawyers, and parties simply confront too many requirements, substantial numbers of which are overly complex, very different, and even
inconsistent, or are quite difficult to find, comprehend, and satisfy.
These developments have undermined the primacy of federal procedures over local ones, effectively eviscerating the national civil procedure code and enormously complicating federal practice, particularly
for entities that litigate in multiple districts, such as the Department of
Justice, public interest organizations like the Sierra Club, and large
corporations.
Some problems can probably be ascribed less to Congress and to
the CJRA as drafted than to additional institutions or the Act's effectuation. For example, the JIA and the CJRA were well-intentioned
attempts to address significant difficulties that involve civil procedure
at the twentieth century's close. However, congressional enactment,
especially of the 1990 legislation, perpetuated, and perhaps compounded, perennial tensions between the legislative and judicial
branches that might be unavoidable in the critical field of court
rulemaking, implicating, as it must, complex questions of separation of
powers and shared duties. 349
Senators and representatives could have viewed the CJRA's
twelfth, open-ended provision as a narrower authorization to prescribe conflicting local requirements than a number of judges considered it. 350 The Advisory Committee concomitantly was more
responsible than Congress for the confusion that arose when the 1993
federal rules revisions became effective on the identical date that numerous districts adopted civil justice plans. 351
Congress may have incompletely understood the objectives, operation, and implementation of the CJRA, particularly its integration
with the JIA. Senators and representatives seemingly failed to apprehend that certain central aspects of the two statutes were inconsistent
349. These ideas may epitomize larger issues involving interbranch relations evinced in annual reports on the judiciary. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States,
1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm>
[hereinafter Year-End Report]; see also Mullenix, supra note 2, at 379-82, 399-400; William H.
Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1.
350. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
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or even that the measures fostered dissimilar, and often diametrically
opposed, procedural precepts. Insofar as Congress foresaw that the
CJRA could clash with, and suspend, the JIA or prevent realization of
the earlier legislation's core purposes, Congress might have meant to
limit those impacts or have deemed the discontinuation a temporary
inconvenience that was outweighed by the greater need to experiment
with local expense and delay reduction mechanisms. 352
In sum, Congress identified cost and delay as important complications in late twentieth-century disputing and provided for entities and
measures that would respond to these problems in the CJRA. Senators and representatives may have not considered comprehensively
the legislation's goals, structure, and implementation, especially in
light of the JIA. The resolution of this and several related difficulties
that I surveyed above could require institutions, strictures, procedural
amendment processes, and methods of experimentation that differ
from the ones that Congress provided or contemplated in the 1988
and 1990 statutes. Attempts to capitalize on the measures and on
their effectuation by emphasizing, building on, and meshing the legislation's finest features and eschewing or limiting the Acts' least desirable dimensions would be more profitable than efforts to harmonize
the statutes. This is particularly true given the possibility of the
CJRA's expiration and the concomitant prospect of reviving and fully
implementing the JIA, which afford the most felicitous solution by
maximizing both enactments' benefits.

III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Introduction
At a rather general level, the objectives of revitalizing and increasing uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and of decreasing expense and delay should continue to animate reform efforts.
These fundamental procedural precepts, even as diluted, have served
the federal courts, Congress, judges, attorneys, parties, and the public
remarkably well for six decades and have respected crucial process
values, such as broad court access and justice. The propositions, as
general principles, also envision that restoration and enhancement of
uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and reduction of cost
and delay are not absolutes, especially when the precepts clash. For
example, the successful practice of judicial case management in many
districts since the 1970s and reliance on specific, different devices to
A.

352. The PSLRA may, and the procedural and the products liability reform proposals could,
have had analogous, albeit narrower, effects on the CJRA. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. The PSLRA passed, and Congress seriously analyzed the other two measures, before
RAND even completed the unprecedented study that Congress commissioned. See supra notes
234-36 and accompanying text. The PSLRA's revision of nine federal rules in securities litigation also complicates realization of the JIA's goals of restoring the national revision process's
primacy and a national procedure code.
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resolve complex suits show that expense and delay imperatives can
override uniformity and transsubstantivity in some circumstances. 353
Attempts to maximize realization of the salutary dimensions of
the two acts prompt more particularized recommendations. Capitalizing on the legislation's best aspects requires that the primacy of the
national rule amendment process be restored. The local procedural
status quo that obtained in 1988 should be secured, while the JIA's
prescriptions pertaining to local strictures, especially the proliferation
of inconsistent requirements, must be comprehensively implemented.
The measures receiving CJRA experimentation that saved money or
time and that honor significant procedural concepts should be included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The mechanisms that
appeared promising, but were insufficiently efficacious to deserve national application, might be identified for future experimentation.
The 1990 statute should sunset, and the entities and procedural
amendment processes that it instituted ought to merge into the ones
that existed or were prescribed in 1988. Congress should clearly state
that CJRA procedures that were less effective must expire, and districts and judges need to abrogate them. A revision in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 83, which resembles the 1991 proposed amendment
that the Advisory Committee withdrew in apparent deference to
CJRA testing, should replace the techniques for experimenting prescribed by the 1990 statute. 354
In short, the analysis above suggests that the preferable approach
is to capitalize on the finest constituents of the JIA and the CJRA.
The remainder of this section affords suggestions for the future, primarily respecting entities, procedures, processes, and experimentation.355 Congress enacted the 1988 and 1990 legislation and has the
ultimate power to fashion procedural policy; however, the following
recommendations are aimed at all applicable decision makers and participants in federal civil litigation. These encompass Congress, national and local procedural revision bodies, federal districts and
judges, court personnel, lawyers, and litigants. Existing institutions
can effectuate most of the proposals absent statutory prescription. 356
This section examines the JIA as well as the CJRA because I suggest
353. See supra notes 30-38, 289-90, 292, and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 429-35 and accompanying text.
355. These parameters are not completely separable. For example, institutions implement
revision processes and adopt procedures through experimentation. The suggestions provide a
conceptual framework for analysis with specific examples but leave technical details to others.
356. Congress can institute most of the ideas that I offer, but it might consider creating a
national civil procedure commission that could implement many recommendations and would
have sufficient independence and resources to develop promising ways of improving civil procedure in the next century. Such a commission must have a staff with no additional duties. A
helpful model is the National Commission on Judicial Discipline. See Colloquy, Disciplining the
Federal Judiciary, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1-430 (1993).
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the 1990 Act's expiration, retention of its premier features, and the
1988 measure's revival and thorough implementation.

B.

A Preliminary Word About Empirical Data

The maximum relevant empirical information that can be systematically collected, evaluated, and synthesized should inform decision
making on the future of the CJRA, the JIA, and the civil justice system. The RAND Corporation and the FJC assembled, assessed, and
synthesized much applicable material in compiling their studies,
although both entities apparently gathered considerable raw data that
they have not scrutinized and that could be instructive. Moreover,
RAND and the Center had relatively narrow assignments to analyze
experimentation with comparatively few procedures in some courts. 357
The remaining seventy-nine districts may also have an enormous mass
of unexamined or undigested material, while the Administrative Office and the FJC have access to similar information. Judges, advisory
groups, lawyers, litigants, and court personnel in all ninety-four districts also might have derived perceptive insights from experimentation that could improve future procedural policy making.
Illustrative of certain ideas in the paragraph above may be the
Montana District, the court with which I am most familiar. 358 My attempt to track CJRA implementation since its inception and my service as an advisory group member since 1994, as well as discussions
with numerous participants in the court's litigation, have led me to
formulate several conclusions that might apply to other districts. For
example, the ability and speed with which the court's magistrate
judges treat cases may have led numerous attorneys and parties to
consider them and Article III judges as similar for purposes of civil
dispute resolution. Automatic disclosure has seemed to work well,
partly because many lawyers and clients have apparently accommodated, rather than strictly complied with, disclosure strictures and because the court reinforces disclosure with a local sanctioning provision
that incorporates, but actually contravenes, Federal Rule 11.359
The perception that requirements for preparing papers and participating in activities make time to disposition longer and litigation
more costly in the federal district has also enhanced state courts' appeal, even as attorneys' experiences with state court mechanisms, such
as mandatory settlement conferences, have seemingly increased their
receptivity to the federal district's application of analogous procedures. Some evidence concomitantly suggests that CJRA experimen357. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
358. I rely here on a series of articles that analyze the Montana District. See Carl Tobias,
Ongoing Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 57 MoNT. L. REv. 511, 511 n.1 (1996).
359. See D. MoNT. R. 200-5(a)(4); see also FED. R. CIV. P. ll(d); Sheetz v. Bridgestone/
Firestone, 152 F.R.D. 628 (D. Mont. 1993).
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tation has reduced the federal bar's size. The examination of other
courts has afforded, or can offer, similar ideas that could be profitably
compared and contrasted. 360
In short, Congress, in resolving the fate of the CJRA and Congress and the Judicial Conference when considering future reforms,
should consult the maximum relevant data. Procedural policy makers
must concomitantly eschew reliance on anecdotal information, which
advocates apparently invoked to support legal reform proposals in the
Contract with America and certain aspects of the 1990 statute. 361 All
of the material that involves CJRA experimentation has yet to be
gathered, evaluated, and synthesized; however, there is ample applicable information on which to premise the recommendations below.
C.

1.

Institutions

National Rule Revision Entities

The national rule amendment institutions must recapture and retain major responsibility for changing those strictures that cover federal civil litigation. The revisors have served Congress, the courts,
judges, attorneys, litigants, and the public very well since the 1930s,
and the entities possess enormous experience and knowledge relating
to federal civil procedure. The institutions can most felicitously revitalize, maintain, and increase the essential procedural precepts, especially uniformity and simplicity, even as they implement exceptions,
when warranted. The entities' broad perspectives facilitate their development of proposals for improvement that take into account what
is preferable for the entire civil justice process. For example, the Judicial Conference has the systemic, expert viewpoint to designate the
measures that deserve adoption by all ninety-four districts or that are
sufficiently efficacious to support departure from the federal rules for
purposes of experimentation or of addressing unusual problems in
specific courts. 362 Congress has trained a national perspective on the
oversight and change of federal rule revisions; however, it has rarely
scrutinized local procedural modifications. 363 Local rules committees
that assist the judges in analyzing and altering district court requirements correspondingly can be more solicitous of local concerns than
of national uniformity or simplicity.
360. See, e.g., Mary B. McManamon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a Cure-All
or a Placebo? An Examination of the Plans of Two Pilot Districts, 11 REV. LITIG. 329 (1992);
Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of Texas: Creating and
Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REv.
LITIG. 165 (1992); see also FJC STUDY, supra note 123; Cavanagh, supra note 116.
361. See supra notes 88-105, 234-36, and accompanying text; see also supra note 352.
362. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 58-60, 73, 167, 199-201, and accompanying text. Even when Congress
evinced concern about local proliferation in the JIA, Congress itself did not scrutinize local
procedures but assigned this task to circuit judicial councils, districts, and individual judges.
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The Advisory Committee, as among those institutions-the Committee, the Standing Committee, the Conference, the Supreme Court,
and Congress-that are involved in national rule amendment, must
remain primarily responsible for studying the federal rules and drafting suggested changes. Every entity above the Advisory Committee
in this hierarchy should continue participating but show increasing
deference to the institution below it. The Court and Congress ought
to remain involved in national rule revision, principally as gatekeepers
that reject, modify, or remand proposed alterations that they find
inadvisable.
My recommendations honor long-standing tradition, such as the
Advisory Committee's recognition and cultivation of uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity. The ideas also reflect the respective interest, expertise, and appreciation for the pragmatic consequences of
procedural change that the entities apparently bring, and the time, energy, and money that they can commit, to rule amendment. The suggestions address a number of problematic, and often inconsistent,
factors. These include the need for Supreme Court and congressional
participation to legitimate rule revision, for multiple institutions with
varying perspectives, experience, and resources to review and improve
proposals, and for comparatively prompt amendment which too many
bodies' involvement confounds. The Court's very deferential scrutiny
of the 1993 federal revisions as well as the Justices' disparate views
regarding that approach's propriety and the advisability of the Rule 11
and 26 amendments support the circumscribed participation that I recommend for the Court. 364 Congress's vacillation in considering the
1993 changes concomitantly justifies the limited role suggested for
it.365

2.

Local Procedural Revision Entities

As among those entities that participate in local procedural revision, the local rules committees that the JIA and Federal Rule 83 require should subsume the advisory groups, which the 1990 Act
prescribed. 366 Too many institutions with similar responsibilities are
involved in the local modification process. The advisory groups have
attained their chief objectives of fostering and evaluating broad experimentation and of promoting valuable interchange among judges, lawyers, and parties, and the bodies, namely, local rules committees, that
they effectively displaced can ably discharge any duties that remain.
The few courts that have yet to name local rules committees must expeditiously appoint them, and these entities should be balanced, in
364. See supra notes 163-65, 197-98, and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 167, 199-210, and accompanying text; see also infra paragraph following
text accompanying note 431 (suggesting why Congress should exercise caution when statutorily
adopting procedures).
366. See supra notes 41-43, 83-84, 108-09, 130-32, 140-41, and accompanying text.

No. 2]

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM SUNSET

611

terms of plaintiff and defense interests, political views, race, and gender, and have the maximum expertise, perhaps including some CJRA
advisory group members whose prior service will be helpful. 367 Specific judges who envision actively adopting new, or amending current,
individual judge procedures should probably appoint their own local
rules committees. Each local entity can advise districts and judges in
developing suggestions for procedural alterations, help secure consensus on the finest strictures, and promote valuable bench-bar
interchange.
As among those institutions that are involved in local procedural
revision, all of the judges of the ninety-four districts, working with
local rules committees, must assume major responsibility for formulating proposed modifications, while particular judges should defer to
these entities when contemplating individual judge measures. All of
the judges, in consultation with the committees, ought to have the expertise, appreciation of local conditions, and concern for national uniformity and simplicity that are necessary to draft and promulgate local
requirements that revive and foster those precepts and that decrease
expense and delay.

3.

Monitoring Entities
The courts, the district judges, the local rules committees, and the
circuit judicial councils, which the CJRA essentially rendered moribund for the purpose of reducing local proliferation, must reassume,
and comprehensively implement, their obligations to review local procedures.368 Of course, the districts, judges, and committees could
thoroughly effectuate the duties by scrutinizing for consistency all local strictures, including mechanisms prescribed under the 1990 statute,
and abrogating or modifying measures deemed to conflict. 369 This approach would enable them to limit, if not obviate, the need for external oversight.
Exogenous institutions should assume some responsibility for
monitoring local procedures in courts whose judges or local rules committees undertake insufficiently rigorous review. For example, circuit
judicial councils, which are to examine periodically the districts' local
requirements and abolish or alter those found inconsistent, must discharge these obligations. Few councils have performed the duties
principally because the CJRA's implementation effectively suspended
367. See supra notes 83, 108-09, 130, 226, and accompanying text. Advisory group members
can improve understanding of the CJRA's history, promote bench-bar exchange, and help harmonize civil justice reform with future procedural efforts. See RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note
108, at 13-26; see also JumCIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D.
62, 67, 82-83 (1997) (recommending continuation of advisory group process).
368. Circuit judicial councils which can best perform oversight should subsume circuit review committees that the CJRA created. See supra notes 86-87, 124, and accompanying text.
369. If Congress allows the CJRA to sunset, districts and judges should abrogate inconsistent CJRA procedures, even though they may wish to retain those that proved efficacious.
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oversight or because Congress failed to authorize funds for monitoring. The entities might consult the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's
review of fifteen districts' local strictures, as that endeavor shows how
to satisfy this responsibility with limited resources, while Congress
could facilitate oversight by allocating the requisite appropriations. 370
If numerous councils remain reluctant to monitor local procedures, even after the CJRA expires and simplifies review by significantly decreasing the number of local requirements that need
evaluation, the Judicial Conference or Congress should apply other
approaches. For instance, a Conference committee, the FJC, or Administrative Office staff might assist specific councils in conducting
oversight. The Conference or Congress could even create a centralized entity, such as a standing committee on local strictures, that
would facilitate national implementation of the JIA's provisions related to proliferation by supporting and coordinating efforts at the circuit and district levels. 371 The Local Rules Project, which has
compiled voluminous, instructive materials on, and possesses enormous expertise regarding, local procedures, can help realize the above
suggestions for reducing proliferation. 372
D.

Procedures

As general propositions, federal civil procedures must restore and
increase uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, while limiting
judicial discretion and expense and delay. These principles warrant
preferring federal rules over local rules, local rules to individual judge
procedures, and written strictures rather than unwritten requirements.
The ideas, as general propositions, are not inviolable, and permit exceptions, especially when the concepts conflict. For example, the need
to experiment with promising measures that save resources or time
may undermine somewhat uniformity and simplicity. In discerning
the appropriateness of implementing particular mechanisms, decision
makers should employ a precisely tuned evaluation that takes into account and balances the core procedural precepts and important process values, such as fairness and court access. 373
370. See Heiser, supra note 135; Tobias, supra note 135; see also Carl Tobias, Suggestions for
Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359 (1995).
371. See Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Federal Procedural Reform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49,
78-79 (1997); see also Heiser, supra note 135, at 580-81.
372. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. Rule 83's 1995 revision proscribing duplicative local procedures should also be implemented. See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (1995 amend.). It
requires as well that "local rules conform with any uniform numbering system that may be prescribed by the Judicial Conference," a system that the Conference recently prescribed and to
which numerous districts have conformed. Id. advisory committee's note (1995 amend.); see also
supra note 54.
373. See Robel, supra note 2, at 1484 (suggesting similar test based on local legal culture). I
examine local procedures before national ones for ease of analysis.
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Local Procedures

The JIA's mandates pertaining to local procedural review, whose
enforcement the CJRA's implementation effectively suspended,
should be strictly observed, so as to halt and even reverse proliferation. All local requirements, particularly procedures of individual
judges, including general, standing, special, and minute orders, and
unwritten practices, that are not needed or that conflict with or duplicate the federal rules or acts of Congress must be abrogated. 374 The
largest number of remaining local strictures should be incorporated in
local rules, while all local procedures must be reduced to writing. Districts and judges, however, should maintain sufficient flexibility to experiment with local requirements that facilitate the discovery of
efficacious new measures and to employ techniques that address unusual conditions that arise in specific courts. 375
When resolving the fate of the CJRA and local procedures applied thereunder, Congress must consult the maximum relevant empirical data that is available on the mechanisms applied in the pilot
and demonstration districts and the remaining courts. This material
includes the information regarding the pilot and demonstration districts that RAND and the FJC studied and on which programs the
Judicial Conference reported to Congress, as well as the annual assessments compiled by every court. The Conference apparently found,
and Congress should remember, that invocation of procedures before
the CJRA's passage suggests, and the 1990 statute's implementation
apparently confirms, that procedural reforms have achieved practically all of the cost and delay reduction that could reasonably be
expected.
The Congress must accurately categorize the measures that received CJRA experimentation. The strictures that clearly conserved
expense or time while respecting significant process values should be
included in the federal rules. 376 Congress could legislatively prescribe
those techniques for which no doubts remain. Procedures as to which
there is lingering uncertainty may deserve consideration in the normal
course of national rule revision. Additional mechanisms that exhibited promise in limiting cost or delay but were insufficiently efficacious to justify national adoption because the money or time saved
was unclear or they eroded other tenets might be identified for further
experimentation. For example, increased reliance on magistrate
judges, which has ameliorated docket pressures in multiple courts, and
certain types of case management, which may be inherently district374. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994); FED. R. C1v. P. 83.
375. See supra note 348 and accompanying text; infra notes 429-35 and accompanying text.
376. The CJRA requires the Judicial Conference to make this judgment regarding the six
statutorily prescribed principles and guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (congressional statement of findings).
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specific, probably need continued testing to ascertain whether they
warrant broader application. Experimentation could proceed pursuant to a variation of the 1991 proposed revision in Rule 83 or under a
statute analogous to legislation prescribing court-annexed
arbitration. 377
Existing information suggests that Congress should allow the
CJRA to expire, which means that districts and judges must abolish
CJRA procedures that conflict with or replicate federal rules or provisions in the United States Code. It is somewhat difficult to designate
conclusively particular measures that deserve nationwide adoption because their evaluation remains unfinished and all relevant material has
not been systematically analyzed and synthesized. However, rather
definitive determinations can be posited by relying upon the RAND
and FJC studies, the Judicial Conference Report, and much information that is available from additional sources, namely, the courts that
experimented. 378 It now seems that some techniques in the general
fields of case management, ADR, and discovery, as well as a number
of devices that the CJRA did not prescribe, will limit expense or delay
and respect the major precepts and important process values.
Narrower suggestions regarding certain procedures can be afforded. Considerable judicial case management conserved time and
perhaps cost, but the context-specific nature of most such activity augurs against broad-based, much less national, application. 379 Differentiated case management seemed to function reasonably well in the
two demonstration districts that intensively practiced it and in some
other courts for very complex and simple or ordinary litigation; however, many judges found that the detriments of classifying cases into
tracks outweighed the benefits. 380 Reliance on several ADR techniques in a few districts apparently yielded financial or temporal savings, but more courts ascertained that most ADR techniques
minimally reduced expense or delay while imposing significant cost. 381
The employment of certain discovery devices in a small number of
districts also seemed to conserve money or time. 382 Numerous courts
applied a miscellany of additional procedures principally pursuant to
the CJRA's open-ended prescription, and certain of these measures
decreased expense or delay. 383
377. See supra notes 74, 218-19, and accompanying text; infra notes 429-35 and accompanying text.
378. See, e.g., RAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 121; FJC STUDY, supra note 123;
JuDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997).
379. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. But see supra note 292 and accompanying
text.
381. See supra notes 289, 296-97, and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 387-88 and accompanying text (analyzing automatic disclosure as national procedure).
383. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (1994).
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A special effort should be instituted to evaluate all of those local
requirements receiving experimentation that RAND or the FJC did
not assess. For example, the Judicial Conference, the Administrative
Office, the FJC, individual districts, judges, and advisory groups
should assemble, analyze, and synthesize the maximum relevant empirical data and forward that material to Congress for its consideration and action in light of the guidance above. 384
2.

National Procedures

Affording very specific ideas is problematic because, for instance,
it is difficult to predict the future of civil litigation and practice, a situation that federal civil procedure's fractured present state compounds.
Nonetheless, I can provide rather general recommendations with illustrations gleaned primarily from the 1993 federal rule revisions pursuant to the disclaimer that those changes remain in the relatively
nascent phases of effectuation.
Federal Rule ll's 1993 amendment has seemingly had certain impacts that the drafters intended. The new version sharply limited incentives to apply it, thus reducing satellite litigation over the provision
and decreasing expense, delay, and chilling effects attributable to the
rule. 385 Several factors complicate conclusive determinations about
the effectiveness of automatic disclosure. These include problems of
implementation, such as erratic enforcement by some districts that
formally adopted the technique 386 and the controversial character of
the federal amendment prescribed, the dearth of analysis accorded the
mechanism, and the unclear results secured in the evaluations undertaken. Anecdotal information suggests that the measure's efficacy is
context dependent. 387 The Supreme Court or Congress, therefore,
should probably refine disclosure by restricting its application to situations in which the device seemed very effective or by authorizing continued experimentation in districts that most successfully implemented
disclosure. 388
The local option procedure, which the revision entities incorporated in the 1993 federal rule amendments principally out of deference to contemporaneous CJRA testing, should be deleted. 389 The
384. See supra notes 348-56 and accompanying text.
385. I premise this on an informal survey of reported and unreported Rule 11 opinions and
on ·discussions with many participants in federal civil litigation. See also JoHN SHAPARD ET AL.,
REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1995); Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, AB.A. J., Mar. 1995, at
12.
386. See supra notes 202-13, 258, and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
388. These suggestions are premised on experimentation with disclosure to date and on the
conversations supra notes 211-13, 215. See also Brendan M. Stephens, Review of Federal Civil
Discovery Rules Aims to Cut Cost, Delay, CHICAGO DAILY L. BuLL., Feb. 26, 1997, at 1.
389. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
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technique imposed more disadvantages, implicating consistency and
simplicity and corresponding cost and delay, than benefits in terms of
enhanced flexibility for experimentation with mechanisms tailored to
individual districts' conditions. 390 The Supreme Court or Congress
should eliminate most other authorizations for local variation in the
federal rules, unless there is a compelling reason to employ different
procedures in the ninety-four courts. For instance, Rule 16's local option proviso appears generally to facilitate the practice of judicial case
management, which can vary significantly among districts, and specifically to accommodate the need for particularized, disparate treatment
of complex and simple civil lawsuits. 391
The rule revision entities and Congress may want to consider
whether several recent trends that involve federal civil litigation
should be addressed more expressly and comprehensively in the existing federal rules. Examples mentioned immediately above are
widespread reliance on judicial case management and on diverse
measures for handling complicated and routine disputes. The revisors
or Congress could explicitly and thoroughly provide in the rules, or
adopt separate sets of federal rules, for case management and for different treatment of complex and ordinary lawsuits. However, the current prescription in Rule 16, the Manual for Complex Litigation,
Third, and numerous courts' local procedures for both practices might
well suffice. 392 Additional modern trends include the declining willingness of many judges and attorneys to adjudicate civil cases as well
as their increased interest in various alternatives to dispute resolution
for settling lawsuits, which are manifested in the rise and growth of
managerial judging and of ADR, as confirmed by CJRA experimentation.393 It may now be appropriate, therefore, to elaborate the rather
sparse provision in the federal rules for ADR and settlement.
E.
1.

Procedural Revision Processes

The National Process

The national rule revision process, rather than local procedural
amendment processes, should regain and retain principal responsibility for modifying those strictures that cover federal civil litigation.
The national process has served the courts, Congress, lawyers, parties,
and the public exceptionally well for six decades. It is best positioned
and equipped to revive and enhance the essential procedural precepts,
390. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 429-35 and accompanying text (illustrating more effective methods of experimentation).
391. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c); see also supra notes 30-40, 290, and accompanying text.
392. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995); supra notes
30-40, 49, and accompanying text.
393. For astute exposition of the ideas in this sentence and the next, see Resnik, supra note
8, at 549-55; Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1991, at 5; see also supra notes 31, 57, 122, 296-97, and accompanying text.
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while the process has accumulated a wealth of expertise and can canvass and take into account the views of the entire federal justice system and its ninety-four districts when drafting proposed rule changes.
For instance, the process is a repository of ideas for promising new
measures that could improve federal civil procedure, and it can survey
the courts and identify those mechanisms that are sufficiently effective
to be incorporated in the federal rules. The multiple phases of review
and revision that comprise the process and its provision for substantial
public participation and for serious consideration of public input improve the quality of draft modifications and ostensibly insure that the
amendments adopted are clear, fair, and responsive to the needs of all
participants in federal civil litigation. These factors and the methodical, systematic manner in which the process unfolds can galvanize consensus, particularly among judges, lawyers, and parties, regarding the
efficacy of proposals.
A few peculiarities that attended the proceedings that culminated
in promulgation of the 1993 federal rules revisions complicate analysis
of the changes in the national amendment process that the JIA imposed.394 This process, which was based primarily on an administrative law construct of federal administrative agency rulemaking,
functioned rather efficaciously, although certain of its aspects may
warrant alteration or refinement. The JIA's strictures apparently
strike an appropriate balance among numerous relevant, and often
competing, factors. These include the benefits, such as the need for
public comment that will inform and enhance the procedural changes
developed and concomitant public acceptability and accountability, of
greater openness and public involvement. 395 More specifically, written submissions and oral presentations of the public apparently convinced the Advisory Committee to institute modifications that
improved the preliminary draft proposals covering Rule 11 and automatic disclosure. 396 Increased openness and public participation also
had certain detrimental impacts, namely, the time and effort required
to address redundant or erroneous contributions and the possibility of
politicizing rule revision which can undercut merits-based
determinations. 397
See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 528-29 (1970) (affording analogous insights
in agency context); Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the
Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82
394.
395.

CowM. L. REv. 906, 941-45 (1982) (same).
396. See, e.g., supra notes 161-62, 184-92, and accompanying text.
397. These are fixed costs of openness. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 395, at 536; Tobias,
supra note 395, at 946-47. The balance may be proper, but Congress might tinker with its model
by analyzing the process's length and amendment's frequency. See SuBCOMMrITEE ON LoNG
RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
(1995), reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679 (1996) [hereinafter SELF-STUDY).
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Having partially assimilated federal rule amendment to federal
agency rulemaking, Congress and the judiciary may want to decide
whether that development should be more thoroughly effectuated.
For example, the process for soliciting, analyzing, and considering
public suggestions might be enhanced by specifically prescribing formal procedures for the Supreme Court to secure and take into account public input or requiring written responses of the other revision
entities to public submissions. 398
More proposals for changing the federal rules must be based on
actual experience involving careful experimentation and stringent assessment of measures' effectiveness with the systematic collection,
evaluation, and synthesis of applicable empirical information. Illustrative of these ideas are the troubling recent experience with automatic disclosure and the difficulties implicating Rule ll's 1983
modification and its consequent enforcement, which necessitated the
1993 amendment. 399 These complications can be partially ascribed to
the lack of experience with the recommended revisions and the paucity of information on how the mechanisms operated in practice
before the alterations were formally proposed and adopted. 400

2.

Local Processes

Numerous propositions respecting the entities that have responsibility for local procedural amendment and the local requirements
themselves are relevant to local processes for modifying procedures. 401 Most importantly, there must be processes that scrutinize all
local strictures, eliminate any provisions that conflict or are unnecessary, include the maximum number of measures that are not local
rules in those procedures, restrict the quantity of local requirements,
and reduce every local stricture to written form. 402
Some of the above ideas regarding the national rule revision process also implicate the JIA's commands that the procedures for changing existing, or adopting new, local measures be regularized and
opened to the public. 403 For example, several reasons complicate assessment of these processes' efficacy. Some courts only recently
adopted amendment procedures, while a small number of districts
have held revision proceedings, and the CJRA discontinued the
398. See Tobias, supra note 147, at 144-46. See generally SELF-STUDY, supra note 397, reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679, 705-06 (1996).
399. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text; see also infra paragraph following text
accompanying note 423 (suggesting why national revision process should generally take precedence over statutory prescription of procedures).
401. See supra notes 366-67, 374-84, and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 288 ·and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 394-400 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (affording 1988 Act's local procedural requirements).
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processes' operation in additional courts. 404 However, a few districts
have apparently conducted efficacious proceedings, and other courts
capitalized on that statute's effectuation to reconsider, reformulate,
and enhance their local strictures. 405
The JIA's mandates covering local procedural revision, like the
national process, seemed to accommodate fairly relevant considerations, such as the need for helpful public comment to improve local
requirements and for minimizing politicization of amendment procedures.406 These analogous conclusions regarding the national and local processes indicate that suggestions relating to national revision
have similar local applicability. An important illustration involves
regularizing and opening local processes to public scrutiny. All of the
district judges in particular courts must cooperate with the local rules
committees to study local procedures and develop proposals for
change, provide the public and the bar notice of the suggested modifications, and solicit input and consider those views when finalizing
amendments. These judges and entities might correspondingly rely on
initiatives that the CJRA prompted. For example, they should continue fostering the constructive exchange of ideas among judicial officers and counsel, the federal districts, and state court systems that
pervaded civil justice reform.

F.

Beyond the CIRA

Once senators and representatives allow the CJRA to sunset, and
federal districts and judges abolish inconsistent local procedures applied thereunder, Congress and the judiciary should explore future reforms. The touchstones for any general course of action and its
specific constituents must be the restoration and enhancement of uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity, and significant process values, the reduction of cost and delay, and the careful harmonization of
those precepts when they are in tension.
The legislative and judicial branches should ascertain as precisely
as possible the need to save additional resources or time in resolving
civil litigation, and, if either is substantial, how further decreases can
best be realized. Assuming that expense and delay remain sufficiently
problematic to warrant ongoing efforts aimed at curbing them, Congress and judges might evaluate the advisability of continuing to apply
procedural solutions. Much of the above examination suggested, and
CJRA experimentation apparently reaffirmed, that federal and state
404. See supra notes 130-31, 136.
405. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF GA., PLAN TO MINI"1IZE CosT
AND DELAY OF CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (1993); Tobias, supra note 297, at 350-51 (discussing Western District of Missouri); Tobias, supra note 131, at 104 (discussing Southern District of West
Virginia).
406. See supra notes 394-400 and accompanying text.
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courts have probably achieved all that could reasonably be expected
by invoking procedures. 407
Congress and the judiciary, therefore, must decide whether cost
or delay is troubling enough to deserve treatment with less conventional, more controversial approaches and, if so, what measures would
be most efficacious in terms of conserving money or time, of restoring
and enhancing uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity while
honoring related process values, and of maximizing other benefits and
minimizing additional disadvantages. If the legislative and judicial
branches choose to proceed, they can consider and apply a broad
spectrum of possibilities.
Senators and representatives could rather easily implement a
number of alternatives that may reduce expense or delay in civil lawsuits. Several options involve federal court resources. For instance,
Congress might appropriate larger budgets for the federal judiciary,408
thereby enabling the courts to institute measures that could facilitate
civil dispute resolution and limit procedural proliferation in the districts. More specifically, numerous circuit judicial councils would
probably discharge their responsibility to review local strictures for
consistency, were legislative funding earmarked for that purpose.
Congress might augment federal court resources by authorizing
new judgeships which would permit the districts to resolve civil cases
more rapidly. The legislative branch has periodically approved additional judges since the 1960s, and as recently as 1990. 409 However, the
current Congress, with Republican Party majorities in each house,
seems unlikely to create judgeships during the administration of a
Democratic president. Even if Congress approved more judges, the
Senate's inability to fill federal court vacancies efficiently could limit
this approach's promise. 410 In any event, senators should implement
numerous suggestions for expediting nominees' confirmation because
promptly appointing members of the bench and seating the full com407. See supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
408. See Year-End Report, supra note 349, at I.A.
409. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. II, §§ 201-206, 104 Stat.
5089, 5098-5104; see also Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629; S. 678, 105th
Cong. (1997), available in WESTLAW, 1997 Cong. US S. 678 (Cong-Billtxt); GORDON BERMANT
ET AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 3-9 (1993).
410. See THE MILLER CENTER OF Pusuc AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING FEDERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter IMPROVING]; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a
Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at A30; see also infra notes 421-22 and
accompanying text. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR
THE FEDERAL CouRTS 102-05, 137-40 (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 121, reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 88-89 (1997); Tobias, supra note
325; Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nominees: The Senate's Steady Progress, WASH. PosT, Jan. 11,
1998, at C9.
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plement of judges authorized will decrease cost and delay in civil
litigation. 411
Additional possibilities do not directly implicate federal court resources. For example, Congress might attempt to write clearer legislation that would ostensibly save the expense and time entailed in
seeking judicial resolution of the meaning of statutory language. 412
The difficulty inherent in drafting unambiguous terminology and the
ease of articulating multiple plausible interpretations, however, proba.
bly limit this alternative's utility. 413
Congress could also reverse, halt, or slow its virtually uninterrupted, three-decade expansion of federal court civil and criminal jurisdiction. For instance, senators and representatives have adopted
fewer statutes that enlarge civil jurisdiction during the 1990s than in
comparable periods of the 1960s and 1970s,414 while the 104th Congress arguably restricted jurisdiction by passing the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 415 However, the three
measures undercut the important process value of court access, as
might other efforts to limit jurisdiction. Moreover, these developments only constitute recent, and perhaps anomalous, exceptions to
jurisdiction's apparently inexorable growth, which senators and representatives seem to find an irresistible, cost-free means of cultivating
constituents, while passage of major crime legislation in 1994 testifies
to these phenomena. 416
Congress or the federal courts could explore and apply structural,
administrative, or organizational remedies, some of which are appar411. See, e.g., IMPROVING, supra note 410, at 3-5, 11; Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude and
the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 732-36 (1995); Carl Tobias,,Filling the Federal
Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 325 (1996); see also Year-End Report, supra
note 349, at I.A.
412. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(l)(D) (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 363
(1992); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRI=
COURT FOR THE DISTRI= OF ALASKA pt. 1, II (1991); see also CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE
EFFE=s OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (A.
Fletcher Mangum ed., Federal Judicial Ctr. 1995); RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108, at 22;
Tobias, supra note 196, at 1535-36.
413. See Gumo CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); see also William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
414. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 284-85; Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (stating that since the
1960s, statutes that expanded federal district court criminal and civil jurisdiction have continuously been passed).
415. See Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1996)); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737;
supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
416. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1370114223 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101~12213 (1994)). See generally LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 410, at 21-39.
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ently so nontraditional that they have never been implemented. For
example, several districts have encouraged the courts' judges to cooperate in resolving cases and the districts to function as a court qua
court. 417 A more unconventional way to attain similar results might
be alteration of the individual calendaring system that judges currently use; however, that modification would forfeit the regime's benefits and be controversial.
The legislative and judicial branches could correspondingly examine and institute less traditional approaches, such as changes in the
existing American adversarial system. Illustrative are the English
Rule, whereby losing parties pay prevailing litigants' attorney's fees,
and judges' assumption of a more active, or inquisitorial, judicial
role. 418 These and numerous other measures, which are widely accepted in England and Europe, may deserve exploration, although
they have historically been perceived as too unconventional for adoption in the United States. 419 Congress, and the bench as well, might
evaluate means of changing lawyer and client conduct, including their
limited ability to appreciate the complexity and stakes of civil lawsuits
and to predict accurately case outcomes, which ultimately increases
litigation costs. The legislative and judicial branches could explore
ways of improving this behavior of attorneys and parties; however, the
measures available may seem overly intrusive or might prove
inefficacious.
G.

The Future of Congressional-Judicial Relations with Special
Reference to Procedural Policy Making

Congress and the federal judiciary must undertake concerted efforts to improve frayed, if not deteriorating, relationships between the
coordinate branches of government. Emblematic, and most relevant
to the issues treated in this article, was the CJRA's enactment. Passage worsened long-standing legislative-judicial conflicts, a phenomenon that may inhere in the important area of court rulemaking.
Tensions relating to rule revision, however, could well be symptomatic
of considerably broader difficulties implicating interbranch relations.
For instance, members of Congress recently castigated individual
judges for their rulings in specific cases, and this activity may have
compromised judicial independence or bred public disrespect for the
417. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
418. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985); John Leubsdorf, Toward History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Wmter 1984, at 9. See generally Robert L. Rossi, ArroRNEYs'
FEES § 7:4 (2d ed. 1995).
419. For example, the Supreme Court has adhered to the American Rule. See Alyeska
Pipeline Sewer Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Few states have correspondingly
adopted the English Rule. See generally Langbein, supra note 418.
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courts. 420 Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Committee circulated questionnaires to judges asking how they spend time, a practice that posed
a similar, albeit less troubling, threat. 421 Members of each branch
have also participated in disputes over courthouse construction, federal courts appropriations, and whether vacancies created by judges
who assumed senior status should be filled. 422
These controversies, which are representative, illustrate the critical need for Congress and the federal judiciary to enhance interbranch
relationships by increasing cooperation and communication, especially
through candid and clear consultation on matters of significance to
either branch. One idea that members of Congress and the bench
should explore, and probably implement, is deferring to the coordinate branch in areas for which it is primarily responsible or that implicate specific expertise. For example, senators and representatives
must refrain from attacking federal judges for decisions in particular
lawsuits because this activity could undercut judicial independence
and public respect. Congress might also accede in the field of federal
procedural revision to members of the judiciary, who have more expertise and day-to-day experience with amendments' practical impacts
and responsibilities. Judges should similarly avoid actions that unduly
pressure senators and representatives to restrict federal court jurisdiction, lest the behavior be perceived as trenching on an area principally
entrusted to members of Congress. 423
The importance of ameliorating interbranch tensions and several
other reasons, such as the need to restore and foster the primacy of
the federal rules, the national revision process, and the fundamental
tenets, indicate that Congress must exercise greater caution in legislating procedures. Senators and representatives should rarely include
strictures that conflict with the federal rules in substantive statutes,
much less pass procedural enactments, such as the Attorney Accountability Act, which would have significantly amended Rule 11 shortly
420. The ABA was so concerned by this dynamic that it created a special commission on the
issue. See John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50; American Bar Association
Examines Judicial Independence, THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1996, at 2; John Gibeaut, Mending Judicial Fences, AB.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 92.
421. See Appellate Survey Results Released, THIRD BRANCH, June 1996, at 5; Conference
Will Submit Institutional Response to Grassley Survey, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1996, at 12.
422. See Hearing on Conserving Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation
of Judgeships in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 1 (1997); Bill to Prioritize
Buildings Passes, THIRD BRANCH, June 1996, at 1; William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary (1995), reprinted in 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 491, 492-93 (1996); see also
105th Congress' First Session Productive for Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1997, at 1-5.
423. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 410, at 21-39, 134-35; see also Lauren K. Robel,
Impermeable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence, and the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 71
IND. L.J. 841 (1996). Some disputes mentioned above are close questions and may reflect the
healthy aspect of interbranch tension.
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after its substantial 1993 revision. 424 Indeed, Congress could restrict
legislative prescription of procedures to modifying flawed federal rule
amendments as the final decision maker in the national revision process. Senators and representatives might even want to remove from
existing acts procedural provisions that contravene the federal rules, a
phenomenon manifested when the PSLRA partially amended nine of
those rules, unless the requirements' deletion would narrowly constrict federal court access or unfairly interfere with settled
expectations.425
Much said above in this subsection and in the article, especially
implicating legislative branch participation in national rule revision,
involves Congress's institutional competence as a procedural policy
maker and suggests that it assume a comparatively limited role in the
future. 426 For instance, senators and representatives apparently did
not attempt to harmonize the CJRA with the JIA or at least failed to
think thoroughly through the two measures' effectuation. Moreover,
Congress had insufficient interest in the CJRA to monitor closely its
implementation or to abstain from embarking on new initiatives
before the 1990 effort had received evaluation. Legislative introduction and consideration of the legal reforms in the Contract with
America and passage of the PSLRA preceded completion of the
RAND and FJC studies, Judicial Conference reports, and a recommendation to Congress predicated thereon, and congressional resolution of the CJRA's fate. 427 The PSLRA's partial modification of
numerous federal rules in securities cases concomitantly eroded those
provisions, uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity and the JIA's
critical purpose of restoring the primacy of the federal rules and national rule revision. 428 Indeed, Congress may lack the requisite understanding of CJRA experimentation to make well-informed decisions
regarding statutory expiration and, therefore, might consider deferring to the suggestions of the Judicial Conference.
424. See H.R. 988, § 4, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Tobias, supra note 234, at 707-10, 721-24.
See generally supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 234-35, 352, and accompanying text. I appreciate that Congress meant
the PSLRA to curb litigation abuse, while it has legislated many procedures to facilitate litigation vindicating rights of statutory beneficiaries, such as discrimination victims. See Tobias,
supra note 11, at 285, 314-17. I could also be criticized for advocating a double standard; however, the needs for broad court access and to honor settled understandings justify differential
treatment.
426. See Burbank, supra note 210, at 856; Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The
Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 800-05, 817-18 (1993); see also Colloquy, Perspectives on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3, 3-112 (1992) (debating efficacy
of 1990 supplemental jurisdiction statute); supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing
Rule 4's legislative revision).
427. See supra notes 121, 123, 234-35, and accompanying text.
428. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737;
see also Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 537, 550-52
(1998); Tobias, supra note 234, at 724-26.
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Finally, nothing that I stated earlier in this article is intended to
intimate that local district testing of promising procedures for reducing expense or delay or fostering significant process values must cease.
On the contrary, my recommendations are completely compatible
with, and I wholeheartedly endorse, efficacious future experimentation, while senators and representatives should prescribe the maximum feasible testing pursuant to the ideas below.
H.

Experimentation

Congress should provide for future experimentation with a comprehensive, balanced approach, premised on a modified version of the
1991 proposed revision in Federal Rule 83 that the Advisory Committee withdrew out of apparent solicitude for the ongoing CJRA endeavor.429 This suggested amendment would have empowered any
district with Judicial Conference authorization to test for as much as
five years local measures that contravene the federal rules or acts of
Congress.430 One or more of the ninety-four courts could function as
laboratories for experimenting with mechanisms that seem efficacious
enough to deserve broader application. 431
The seven-year CJRA effort and recent experience involving
court-annexed arbitration might also guide future testing. For instance, the 1990 statute's implementation teaches the importance of
centralized coordination and oversight and cautions against too much
simultaneous experimentation with significant numbers of inconsistent procedures. The court-annexed arbitration endeavor concomitantly illustrates the advisability of testing and evaluating specific
devices in relatively few districts and gradually expanding work with
techniques that prove effective. 432 Courts, judges, the Judicial Conference, and Congress, therefore, should carefully consider and calibrate
experimentation.
Each of the district judges in conjunction with local rules committees of all ninety-four courts might study their local circumstances
when designing and proffering experimental programs. These judges
and entities could draw upon, and perhaps elaborate, the CJRA's effectuation in their own and the remaining districts, as well as state civil
justice reform activities, when analyzing and designating measures
that might warrant testing and when developing experimental proto429. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. I rely substantially here on A Leo
Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
(1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67; see also Levin, supra, at 1585-87 (suggesting why reasons implicating authority require Congress, not rule revisors, to prescribe Rule
83 revision).
430. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
431. The Rule 83 proposal included no criteria for analyzing proposals to experiment. The
procedures proffered should show promise and be necessary to treat specific problems.
432. See supra note 74.
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cols. For example, helpful sources of information and ideas should be
the advisory group reports, the expense and delay reduction plans,
and the annual assessments prepared under the 1990 legislation; the
procedures, particularly the principles, guidelines, and techniques that
actually received experimentation and evaluation; and the participants
involved in the federal efforts. Local districts, judges, and committees
might correspondingly rely on the enormous quantity of valuable material and the accumulated technical expertise that exist in the Administrative Office, the FJC, and the Judicial Conference committees as
well as in state civil justice systems, much of which is available through
the National Center for State Courts (NCSC).
The Judicial Conference could structure and coordinate testing
with the approval mechanism in the proposed Rule 83 revision that
the Advisory Committee withdrew. For instance, it can guarantee
that experimentation proceeds under optimal conditions by meticulously monitoring the number of districts that are testing similar measures at the same time. The Conference should concomitantly
encourage experimentation in enough circumstances to afford statistical validity and a sense of the procedures' efficacy but in sufficiently
few situations to minimize duplication and disruption of daily dispute
resolution.
A critical aspect of any experimentation that courts undertake
will be its rigorous assessment. For example, the districts should articulate and apply defensible analytical standards, create appropriate
baselines, invoke proper mechanisms for evaluating measures' impacts, and assess the procedures with adequate rigor in different contexts for sufficient periods to ascertain accurately their effectiveness.
Informative templates are the RAND and FJC analyses of pilot and
demonstration court testing and numerous studies that the FJC, the
Administrative Office, and the NCSC have performed. 433 The districts could depend on court staff who participated in civil justice reform and on the FJC and the Administrative Office for technical
assistance in their evaluative efforts, while the districts might rely on
these policy arms or the Judicial Conference to coordinate assessment
across courts or to supply perspective or additional expertise.
When experience with, and analysis of, particular mechanisms in
specific districts suggest that more courts could employ the techniques, the Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference must determine whether the measures require greater experimentation or are
effective enough to deserve nationwide enforcement. Should increased testing be warranted, the Committee or 'the Conference must
estimate how much additional work is needed and identify commodious contexts for future efforts. When either entity finds national ap433.
ET AL.,

See, e.g., RAND PILOT STUDY, supra note 108; FJC STUDY, supra note 123; CHURCH
supra note 337; MEIERHOEFER, supra note 74; SHAPARD ET AL., supra note 385.
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plication appropriate, the Advisory Committee ought to develop
proposed revisions for examination in the federal rule amendment
process. The Committee should have final responsibility for the duties delineated in this paragraph and for general oversight and coordination because it has a number of rule revision obligations, a systemic
viewpoint, and considerable experience with, and appreciation for, the
practical effects of civil litigation, experimentation, and procedural
change. 434
Many reasons warrant prescription and implementation of the
approach suggested. It is premised upon the well-considered, readily
available model in the proposed Rule 83 amendment. 435 This course
of action invokes institutions that have substantial expertise related to
testing and capitalizes on the CJRA experience. The approach accommodates numerous perspectives and needs, certain of which are
even conflicting. For instance, it affords the necessary flexibility to
undertake the experimentation that should foster the discovery and
application of mechanisms that revive and reinforce the essential procedural precepts, including economical, expeditious dispute resolution, but limits the disruption of day-to-day case disposition. This
method of proceeding is purposely structured in a circumscribed manner that avoids or minimizes some problems with the CJRA's effectuation, namely, the local proliferation of inconsistent strictures and the
concomitant propensity to increase fragmentation, cost, and delay. It
correspondingly capitalizes on this statute by facilitating the development of promising experiments from the bottom up and by employing
lessons from the seven-year effort. For example, centralized, systematic control over the number of courts that can simultaneously apply
identical measures should permit many districts to profit from earlier
testing and facilitate the effective analysis of experimentation as it
progresses. The approach also accommodates additional work with
judicial case management, which probably represented _the CJRA's
greatest success, even though its practice varied significantly across
courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 were valuable attempts to improve the state of
modem federal civil procedure. Diverse, and perhaps inconsistent, visions of the most pressing complications in fin-de-siecle civil litigation
and of appropriate remedies for those problems apparently motivated
the legislation's drafters. The two measures have been in tension because the CJRA's proponents may have failed to think fully through
434. The Conference or one of its committees would be equally competent to assume these
duties, and the Advisory Committee should consult them.
435. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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its effectuation and apparently did not harmonize the acts' implementation. Despite these conflicts and additional difficulties involving the
JIA and CJRA and their application, each statute offered a number of
advantages. If the individuals and entities with responsibility for the
condition of federal civil procedure follow the recommendations in
this article, they can realize the legislation's best features and enhance
civil litigation as federal courts enter the twenty-first century.

